Terrorist attacks, investor sentiment, and the pricing of initial public offerings by Chen, Yangyang et al.
UCC Library and UCC researchers have made this item openly available.
Please let us know how this has helped you. Thanks!
Title Terrorist attacks, investor sentiment, and the pricing of initial public
offerings
Author(s) Chen, Yangyang; Goyal, Abhinav; Veeraraghavan, Madhu; Zolotoy,
Leon
Publication date 2020-11-07
Original citation Chen, Y., Goyal, A., Veeraraghavan, M. and Zolotoy, L. (2020)
'Terrorist attacks, investor sentiment, and the pricing of initial public
offerings', Journal of Corporate Finance, 65, 101780 (26 pp). doi:
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101780





Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is
made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Embargo information Access to this article is restricted until 12 months after publication by
request of the publisher.
















College of Business 




Cork University Business School – CUBS 




Finance and Strategy Area 




Melbourne Business School 
















* Corresponding author. Address: 200 Leicester Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia. E-mail: 
l.zolotoy@mbs.edu. Tel. 61-3-93498167.  
We are grateful to Xin Chang, Thomas Chemmanur, Rui Ge, Kose John, Endong Yang, Ying Zheng, 
James Frederickson and participants of the 2019 Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Area Research Forum 
on Business and seminars at the University of Queensland, Monash University, the Royal Melbourne 
Institute of Technology, and Hong Kong Baptist University for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 









Using terrorist attacks as exogenous shocks to investor sentiment, we study the impact of 
investor sentiment on initial public offering (IPO) pricing. IPOs listed within the 30-day period 
following terrorist attacks, on average, experience lower first-day returns. The documented 
impact of terrorist attacks is magnified when there is greater IPO valuation uncertainty and 
when the terrorist attacks are more salient to investors, while mitigated for IPOs “certified” by 
reputable intermediaries. We also show that the affected IPOs, on average, have more 
pessimistic media tone in the post-attack/pre-listing day period. The affected IPOs also tend to 
have lower levels of price revisions, subscriptions, primary share revisions, and total proceeds. 
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The initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon—the tendency of IPO share 
prices to experience a substantial upward jump on the first day of trading—has received 
ongoing attention from finance scholars, practitioners, and regulators. The striking empirical 
regularity of IPO underpricing has given rise to several theoretical models of its potential 
mechanisms.1 Within this literature, a growing stream of research has been advancing investor 
sentiment as a salient factor in shaping the pricing of new issues (Derrien 2005; Cornelli et al. 
2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2006). Sentiment-based IPO pricing theories assume two types of 
investors: informed institutional investors and sentiment-driven bullish retail investors. The 
investment banker partially adjusts the offer price to reflect the bullish sentiment of retail 
investors, allowing the issuer to benefit from a higher valuation than appropriate, given the 
intrinsic value of the issue. In turn, institutional investors benefit from selling their allocations 
to retail investors, who have higher valuations. With the rise (fall) in retail investor bullishness, 
the difference between the offer price and the early aftermarket price increases (decreases). 
Therefore, sentiment-based theories of IPO pricing predict a positive relation between investor 
sentiment and IPO first-day returns. 
The absence of stock price history and the informational opacity of new issues create a 
fertile setting for investor sentiment to influence IPO valuations (Ljungqvist 2007). Yet, there 
is a lack of consensus in the empirical literature on the role of investor sentiment in shaping 
IPO outcomes and the dynamics of the IPO market (Lowry et al. 2017), reflecting major 
empirical challenges associated with measuring investor sentiment. First, the vast majority of 
sentiment proxies are output based; that is, these proxies include measures of financial 
performance (the outputs of sentiment) to capture sentiment (Qui and Welch 2006).2 This 
 
1 For extensive reviews of the literature, see Ljungqvist (2007), Ritter (2011) and Lowry et al. (2017). 
2 An alternative approach for gauging investor sentiment is to use investor surveys. However, the available data 
are very limited in terms of both scope and frequency and depend heavily on how the survey is designed (Zhou 
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“circularity” issue is particularly salient in the IPO setting, since IPO performance indicators 
(e.g., first-day returns, “grey market” prices and proxies for retail investor demand)—the 
outputs of investor sentiment—are commonly used as inputs in constructing investor sentiment 
proxies (e.g., Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007; Derrien 2005; Cornelli et al. 2006; McLean and 
Zhao 2014; Huang et al. 2015). Second, prior research shows that investor sentiment proxies 
are strongly correlated with changes in economy-wide conditions and risk factors (Cherkes et 
al. 2009; Sibley et al. 2016), raising concerns regarding the information content and 
endogeneity of these proxies.3 Third, prior studies (e.g., Lee et al. 1991; Loughran et al. 1994) 
provide evidence consistent with issuers strategically timing IPOs to coincide with periods of 
excessive optimism on the market, which could lead to substantial self-selection issues. 
With the above caveats in mind, we study the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing 
using a research setting in which sentiment is exogenously induced (“primed”). We use the 
incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period as exogenous shocks to investor sentiment. 
Edmans et al. (2007) note that a sentiment-priming construct should satisfy three key 
characteristics: (1) it must drive sentiment in a substantial and unambiguous manner, (2) it must 
impact the sentiment of a large proportion of the population, and (3) its effect must be 
correlated across the majority of individuals within a country.4 We argue that terrorist attacks 
meet these three criteria. With regard to the first criterion, an extensive body of the psychology 
literature provides compelling evidence that terrorist attacks exert a strong negative impact on 
individuals’ emotions, eliciting heightened perceptions of threat, anxiety, and depression (e.g., 
Galea et al. 2002; Hughes et al. 2011). As negative events provoke stronger behavioral and 
 
2018). Furthermore, survey data can suffer from self-selection and response biases: informed investors can choose 
to not respond, and those who respond might not have an incentive to reveal the truth (Zhou 2018). 
3 For example, Sibley et al. (2016) show that the predictive power of Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) sentiment 
index—the most widely used sentiment measure (Zhou 2018)—is predominantly driven by the business cycle and 
risk components. Relatedly, Cherkes et al. (2009) demonstrate that closed-end fund discounts—another common 
measure of investor sentiment—can be generated in a rational, liquidity-based model. 
4 Finance scholars tend to use the terms sentiment and mood interchangeably. In the interest of maintaining 
consistency with prior literature (Derrien 2005; Cornelli et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2006), we use the term 
sentiment throughout the paper. 
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cognitive reactions than positive events (Baumeister et al. 2001), using terrorist attacks as a 
sentiment-priming construct enhances the power of our tests. Moreover, prior research 
demonstrates that pessimism induced by salient negative events influences decision making in 
unrelated domains, including financial investment decisions (e.g., Kaplanski and Levy 2010; 
Wang and Young 2020). With regard to the second and third criteria outlined by Edmans et al. 
(2007), prior research shows that intense media coverage facilitates the dissemination of news 
about terrorist attacks, causing negative sentiment induced by these attacks to become 
widespread and naturally synchronized among the population (Slone 2000; Nellis and Savage 
2012). Further, since terrorist attacks are unanticipated by investors (Wang and Young 2020), 
the use of terrorist attacks as a prime of investor sentiment alleviates potential endogeneity and 
self-selection issues.5 
Insights from prior literature offer competing predictions for the impact of pre-IPO 
terrorist attacks on IPO pricing. On the one hand, sentiment-based theories of IPO pricing 
stipulate that underwriters partially adjust the final offer price to reflect bullish valuations of 
retail (i.e., sentiment-driven) investors in early aftermarket trading, implying that IPO first-day 
return should be positively related to retail investor sentiment (Derrien 2005; Ljungqvist et al. 
2006). Buidling on prior literature showing that terrorist attacks negatively impact individuals’ 
emotions, we reason that incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period could cause retail 
investors to become less bullish on the new issues. The foregoing discussion suggests that IPOs 
 
5 A clarification of our research design is warranted. In our setting, it is important to delineate between the 
following two distinct questions: (1) What is the plausible empirical construct for capturing investor sentiment? 
and (2) Does investor sentiment impact the pricing of IPOs? Having identified a theoretically grounded investor 
sentiment construct (i.e., incidences of terrorist attacks), we use it to examine whether investor sentiment affects 
IPO pricing. It is imperative to stress that identifying an appropriate sentiment construct does not imply that it 
would affect IPO pricing in the manner predicted by investor sentiment models—if at all. To rule out potential 
confounding non-sentiment channels, we draw upon investor sentiment literature (Ljungqvist et al. 2006; Baker 
and Wurgler 2006, 2007) to derive a set of testable predictions for the terrorist attack-IPO underpricing 
relationship. Our approach is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Edmans et al. 2007; Wang and Young 2020) that 




with incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period, on average, should experience lower 
first-day returns. 
On the other hand, several conflating factors could bias against finding supportive 
evidence for this conjecture. First, recent studies provide evidence that institutional investors—
who are cast as informed and rational IPO market participants by sentiment-based IPO pricing 
theories—are also susceptible to cognitive biases (Fang et al. 2014; Goetzmann et al. 2015). 
By eliciting feelings of fear and heightened perceptions of threat, pre-IPO terrorist attacks 
could cause institutional investors to perceive higher levels of uncertainty regarding the 
offering’s value, resulting in the higher underpricing of the new issue and, consequently, higher 
first-day return (Beatty and Ritter 1986). Second, by inducing negative sentiment among 
executives of the issuing firm, pre-IPO terrorist attacks could cause management to become 
more risk-averse and adopt a more cautious, conservative approach in setting the final offer 
price, driving up the underpricing discount of the new issue. Third, underwriters could intensify 
their efforts to market the new issue (Cook et al. 2006) in an attempt to offset the negative 
shock to investor sentiment induced by the attacks. Given confounding effects of these factors, 
ultimately, it is an empirical question as to whether incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-
IPO period result in lower or higher first-day returns.  
To address this question, we utilize a comprehensive sample of U.S. IPOs spanning the 
period 1994–2016. To identify IPOs with incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period, 
we merge this sample with data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which contains 
systematic and detailed records of terrorist events. We find that IPOs listed within 30-day 
period following terrorist attacks, on average, experience significantly lower first-day returns 
compared to nonaffected IPOs (i.e., IPOs with no incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO 
period). The documented effect is economically meaningful: controlling for known 
determinants of IPO underpricing, the average IPO first-day return for the issuing firms with 
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pre-IPO terrorist attacks is 10.77 percentage points lower compared to nonaffected IPOs, a 
reduction of 36.5% compared to the sample mean. 
To assess the robustness of our baseline results, we conduct an array of sensitivity tests. 
We consider the possibility that pre-IPO terrorist attacks result in lower pre-IPO media 
coverage, diverting retail investor attention away from IPO firms. In turn, a reduction in IPO 
firm visibility can result in lower first-day returns (Cook et al. 2006). To examine this issue, 
we control for an array of visibility proxies suggested by prior literature in our analysis. We 
further verify that our results are not driven by IPOs in the tourism or transportation industry, 
namely, IPO firms whose economic output could be directly affected by terrorist attacks. We 
also verify that our results hold when we use a propensity score–matched sample, alleviating 
concerns regarding potential self-selection. Finally, we perform a series of placebo tests to 
show that our findings are unlikely to be driven by artifacts of the underlying data. 
Since investor sentiment is “a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is 
not justified by the facts at hand” (Baker and Wurgler 2007, p.129), the stipulated investor 
sentiment channel implies that terrorist attacks negatively influence investors’ subjective 
beliefs about IPO firms’ prospects, but not IPO firms’ fundamentals. It follows that we should 
observe the following two patterns in our sample: (1) a positive association between incidences 
of pre-IPO terrorist attacks and the degree of pessimism in investors’ beliefs and (2) no 
association between incidences of pre-IPO terrorist attacks and post-IPO operating 
performance.6 Building on prior literature (Tetlock 2007; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Garcia 
2013), we use the tone of media articles discussing an IPO firm to gauge prevailing IPO firm-
related beliefs among investors. Using a propensity score matching design, we find that IPOs 
with incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period have a more pessimistic media tone 
 
6 The investor sentiment channel implies that terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period should have no direct effect 
on the operating performance of issuing firms in the post-IPO period. However, negative investor sentiment 
induced by terrorist attacks could impact post-IPO operating performance indirectly by adversely affecting IPO 
proceeds of issuing firms. We revisit this issue in Section 6.2. 
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in the post-attack/pre-IPO date time window compared to nonaffected IPOs. At the same time, 
we find no significant association between pre-IPO terrorist attacks and post-IPO operating 
performance. Taken together, these results provide corroborating evidence for investor 
sentiment as the mechanism driving our findings. 
We next explore cross-sectional variation in the documented relation between terrorist 
attacks and IPO first-day returns. If the investor sentiment channel is indeed the mechanism 
driving our findings, the negative association between pre-IPO terrorist attacks and IPO first-
day returns should be amplified (mitigated) in settings in which the role of investor sentiment 
is expected to be more (less) salient. We begin by examining whether the documented effect 
of pre-IPO terrorist attacks is amplified for IPO firms that are difficult to value. Baker and 
Wurgler (2006, 2007) assert that the stocks of firms with higher levels of information 
uncertainty—such as young firms, firms with low profitability, and firms with a high 
proportion of intangible assets—are more difficult to value, making biases more insidious and 
valuation mistakes more likely. Consequently, such stocks are expected to be more sensitive to 
investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007). Building on these insights, we conjecture 
that the documented effect of terrorist attacks should be amplified for IPO firms with these 
characteristics. Our results are consistent with this expectation. 
We further explore the impact of IPO certification on the documented effect of terrorist 
attacks. Prior research suggests that the presence of prestigious intermediaries (e.g., 
underwriters with a strong reputation and Big 4 auditing firms) and venture capitalist investors 
plays an important “certification” role for a new issue, reducing information uncertainty faced 
by the market (Booth and Smith 1986; Carter and Manaster 1990; Megginson and Weiss 1991; 
Menon and Williams 1991; Michaely and Shaw 1994; Bajo et al. 2016). Since the role of 
investor sentiment is more salient when information uncertainty is high (Baker and Wurgler 
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2006, 2007), we reason that the effect of terrorist attacks should be mitigated for IPOs with 
such certification. Our results support this prediction. 
We also explore how the strength of the documented relation varies with the salience of 
attacks for IPO investors. Prior research (e.g., Galea et al. 2002; Hughes et al. 2011) suggests 
that the impact of an event on individuals’ beliefs and behaviors is amplified with the salience 
of an event. Therefore, we expect the documented effect of pre-IPO terrorist attacks to be 
amplified if there are more terrorist attacks prior to the IPO date and if these attacks lead to 
greater numbers of fatalities. In a similar vein, we reason that the documented effect should be 
amplified for attacks that occur at one of the financial centers and attacks that are closer to the 
IPO date. Further, since retail (i.e., sentiment-driven) investors tend to focus on the stocks of 
locally headquartered firms (Seasholes and Zhu 2010; Korniotis and Kumar 2013), we reason 
that the documented relation should be amplified for attacks that take place in locations closer 
to the IPO firms’ headquarters. Our results corroborate these predictions. 
To add further texture to our analysis, we undertake two sets of supplemental tests. First, 
we examine the association between pre-IPO terrorist attacks and post-listing day stock returns. 
Ljungqvist (2007) notes that sentiment-driven IPO first-day returns should revert in the post-
listing day period. It follows that if the documented negative effect of terrorist attacks on IPO 
first-day returns reflects investor sentiment, such an effect should revert in the post-listing day 
period. Accordingly, we should observe a positive association between pre-IPO terrorist attacks 
and post-listing day stock returns. Our results are consistent with this expectation. 
Second, we examine the relation between pre-IPO terrorist attacks and a set of alternative 
measures of IPO performance studied in prior literature (e.g., Benveniste and Wilhelm 1990; 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003; Cook et al. 2006; Wang and Yung 2015), which includes price 
revision, oversubscription, total proceeds, and primary share revision. Sentiment-based IPO 
pricing models stipulate that underwriters partially adjust the final offer price to reflect the 
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sentiment-driven valuation of the new issue by retail investors in early aftermarket trading, 
implying that investor sentiment should be positively associated with IPO price revisions 
(Cook et al. 2006). Accordingly, we conjecture that IPOs with terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO 
period, on average, undergo lower price revisions compared to nonaffected IPOs. Our results 
support this prediction. We also find that IPOs with terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period, on 
average, are less likely to be oversubscribed and have lower total proceeds and primary share 
revisions. The entirety of the results is consistent with our argument that pre-IPO terrorist 
attacks adversely impact investor sentiment, resulting in lower demand for the IPO stock and 
less capital raised during the IPO. 
Our study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. Our first contribution is 
to the emerging stream of research examining the role of investor sentiment in IPO pricing 
(Derrien 2005; Cornelli et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2006; Boulton et al. 2020). Cornelli et al. 
(2006) use prices from the grey market (the when-issued market that precedes European IPOs) 
to proxy for investor sentiment. They document that high grey market prices are positively 
associated with first-day aftermarket prices and increase the likelihood of subsequent long-run 
price reversals. Boulton et al. (2020) conclude that short-selling restrictions amplify the 
positive association between investor sentiment and IPO underpricing, using consumer 
confidence index as a proxy for investor sentiment. While these studies cast investor sentiment 
as a potentially important antecedent of IPO undepricing, circularity issues and inherent 
endogeneity of investor sentiment proxies (Qui and Welch 2006; Sibley et al. 2016) pose major 
challenges to establishing causal links in this relationship.  We address these challenges by 
using incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period as exogenous shocks to investor 
sentiment. Our results provide support for the sentiment-based theories of IPO pricing (Derrien 
2005; Ljungqvist et al. 2006) and underscore the salience of investor sentiment in shaping IPO 
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outcomes. In this context, our study responds to Ljungqvist’s (2007, p.380) call for “behavioral 
approaches to explain why the extent of underpricing varies so much over time.” 
Our second contribution is to the literature examining the impact of terrorism on financial 
market outcomes and corporate policies. Studies in this stream of research predominantly focus 
on the macroeconomic and market-wide effects of terrorism (Chen and Siems 2004; Eckstein 
and Tsiddon 2004; Chesney et al. 2011; Wang and Young 2020). Complementing these studies, 
an emerging stream of research explores the impact of terrorist attacks at the micro (firm) level 
by studying the influence of attacks on the corporate investment and compensation policies 
(Antoniou et al. 2017, Dai et al. 2020). We extend this literature by providing firm-level 
evidence of the role of terrorist attacks in shaping IPO outcomes. 
Our findings also carry potential implications for investment practitioners and regulators. 
As Martin Feldstein notes in a keynote speech at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association, “the economics of security is one of the most important issues in our 
discipline, yet, the one least researched.” In the United States, the ongoing threat of terrorism 
has changed everything from defense and immigration policy, to an awareness of homegrown 
terrorism and the heightened sense of personal safety in a crowd (Wang and Young 2020). 
While most studies consider the direct output costs of terrorist attacks to be relatively low and 
short-term (Llussa and Tavares 2011), terrorism has the capacity to erode the sense of 
community or national security, damage morale and cohesion, and open the ethnic, economic, 
and religious cracks in society (Stith Buttler et al. 2003). Given the marked increase in the 
intensity of terrorist attacks in recent times (Miller 2016), our findings suggest that regulators 
should consider the adverse effects of terrorist attacks on firms’ ability to raise external funds 
when assessing the costs of terrorism and forming policies. Our results also imply that 
investment practitioners should consider incorporating the impact of negative sentiment 
induced by terrorist attacks on IPO valuations in their investment decisions. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and variables. Section 
3 discusses the baseline findings and the results of sensitivity tests. Section 4 tests the validity 
of the key assumptions underpinning our analysis. Section 5 presents the results of cross-
sectional tests and Section 6 outlines the results of supplemental analyses. Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Sample and Variables 
2.1 Sample 
We obtain the data for the study from multiple sources. The terrorist attacks data are 
obtained from the June 2017 edition of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an open source 
database that contains systematic data on global terrorist events. The GTD defines a terrorist 
attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain 
a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” (GTD 
Codebook 2019, p.10).7 The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) makes the GTD available via its online interface. We collect 
information on the exact source, date, location, number of causalities, and specific motive 
behind the terrorist attacks from the database. Our sample includes terrorist attacks that took 
place in the U.S. from 1994 to 2016.8 We focus on the U.S. market because it is the most active 
IPO market in the world (Ljungqvist 2007). By focusing on a single country, we also obtain a 
more homogeneous sample in terms of regulations and institutional factors (Ljungqvist 2007), 
facilitating comparison of the effects of pre-IPO terrorist attacks across IPOs. 
 
7 To be included in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present: (1) the incident must be 
intentional, (2) the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence and (3) the 
perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. In addition, at least two of the following three criteria 
must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD: (1) the act must be aimed at attaining a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal, (2) there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims, (3) the action must be outside 
the context of legitimate warfare activities. (GTD Codebook 2019). 
8 The data on terrorist attacks that took place in 1993 are not available from the GTD. They were lost prior to 
START’s compilation of the GTD through multiple data collection efforts. Therefore, we commence our study in 
1994 to prevent our results from being biased due to the loss of terrorist attack data in 1993. 
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Following prior literature, we include terrorist attacks that resulted in at least one 
casualty, since these attacks are perceived to have a greater negative impact on human emotions 
(Antoniou et al. 2017; Kearns et al. 2019). To further filter out low-impact events, we only 
consider terrorist attacks covered in at least one of the national media (print or television) 
within 72 hours of the attack. We provide a detailed description of the terrorist attacks included 
in our sample in Appendix A. The appendix shows that terrorist attacks vary considerably by 
the target of the attack as well as by the number of fatalities, with the Alfred P. Murray Federal 
Building bombing having the largest number of fatalities in our sample.9  
We use the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database as our primary data source on 
new issues by firms in the U.S. We obtain financial statement information of IPO firms from 
Compustat and Worldscope and post-listing stock price information from CRSP and 
Datastream. Following prior IPO literature (Cook et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2014), we exclude 
foreign ADRs, closed-end funds, rights offerings, unit offerings, real estate investment trusts, 
limited partnerships, and depository receipts. We also exclude IPOs with missing information 
regarding their listing day returns. Further, we require the IPO firms to have nonmissing 
information of the control variables. Our final sample consists of 3,683 IPOs in the U.S. over 
the period 1994–2016. We summarize our sample selection procedure in Appendix B. 
2.2 Variables 
Our dependent variable is the IPO first-day return (First-day return). Following prior 
research (e.g., Bajo et al. 2016; Ljungqvist 2007), we calculate First-day return as the first-day 
closing price of an IPO minus its offer price, scaled by the offer price. Following prior literature 
(e.g., Boulton et al. 2010), we winsorize the variable in the bottom and top one percentiles to 
 
9 Our sample does not include the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks in 2001. As we discuss in Section 2.2, to be 
included in our sample, an attack must have at least one IPO listed in the 30-day period following the attack to 
allow us to examine the impact of the attack on IPO investor sentiment. The 9/11 World Trade Center attacks do 
no meet this inclusion criterion. Further, due to the economy-wide nature of shocks induced by the 9/11 attacks 
(Kim and Kung 2017), the impact of these attacks on IPO pricing could reflect stock market revision of firms’ 
fundamentals rather than investor sentiment. 
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mitigate the potential impact of outliers. Our key explanatory variable of interest is the terrorist 
attack dummy (Attack), which is equal to one if at least one terrorist attack occurred within the 
30 days prior to the IPO listing date, and zero otherwise.10 
Our selection of firm-level control variables is in line with prior literature (e.g., Bajo et 
al. 2016; Bajo and Raimondo 2017; Colack et al. 2017; Chemmanur and Yan 2017). The 
variable Profitability is defined as earnings before interest and taxes, divided by total assets; 
Asset turnover is calculated as sales divided by total assets; Offer Size is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of the total proceeds raised in the IPO; Market-to-book is calculated as market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity; Leverage is measured as the ratio of total 
debt over total assets; Float is the proportion of regular shares issued by the firm to the public 
and available to trade; Underwriter is the reputation rank of the lead underwriter at the time of 
listing, based on the updated Carter and Manaster (1990) classification. Further, Big 4 auditor 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO firm is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm, and zero 
otherwise; VC back is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO firm is backed by venture 
capital, and zero otherwise; Commitment is a dummy variable equal to one if the underwriter 
guarantees to purchase all the securities offered for sale by the issuer regardless of whether 
they can sell them to investors, and zero otherwise 11; Firm age is the natural logarithm of the 
difference between the year of listing and year the firm was founded; Equity carve-out is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the IPO firm is an equity carve-out from another firm, and zero 
otherwise; NASDAQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO was listed on the NASDAQ, 
and zero otherwise. 
Prior literature (e.g., Sibley et al. 2016) emphasizes the importance of controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions when examining the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices. 
 
10 We focus on the 30 days prior to the IPO date because investor interest in the IPO is more likely to intensify in 
the short window leading up to the firm’s listing (Liu et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2020). 
11 Our results remain intact when we exclude the best efforts IPOs from our sample. 
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Accordingly, we include a wide array of macroeconomic and market-wide controls. We include 
monthly change in the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index 
(ΔConsumer sentiment) as prior literature shows the role of this variable as a leading indicator 
of real economic conditions (Song and Shin 2019). We also include monthly change in the 
OECD business confidence index (ΔBusiness confidence) which helps in monitoring output 
growth and anticipating turning points in economic activity (OECD 2003). We obtain the data 
for the two variables from the Main Economic Indicators published by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.12 We include monthly change in the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index (ΔPolicy uncertainty) as prior research shows that innovations in 
policy uncertainty foreshadow declines in investment, output, and employment (Baker et al. 
2016); we obtain the data for this variable from the Economic Policy Uncertainty database.13  
We also include aggregate revision in analysts’ earnings forecasts at the end of the month (EPS 
forecast revision) as prior studies show that aggregate earnings growth helps in predicting 
future inflation and GDP growth (Konchitchki and Patatoukas 2014; Shivakumar and Urcan 
2017); the data for this variable was obtained from I/B/E/S. In addition, we include monthly 
changes in real risk premium (ΔReal risk premium) and real interest rate (ΔReal 10-year rate) 
given the evidence from literature that both variables vary with and predict turning points in 
business cycles (Harvey 1989; King and Watson 1996). We obtain the data for these two 
variables from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. We also include Market Return defined 
as the excess return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index over the three months preceding the 
IPO. We obtain the data from Datastream. Lastly, we control for election cycles (Aksoy 2014) 
by including Election, which takes the value of one if a senate or presidential election took 
place in the 30 days prior to the listing date, and zero otherwise. We obtain the data for this 
 
12 Available at https://data.oecd.org/leadind/consumer-confidence-index-cci.htm. 
13 Available at http://www.policyuncertainty.com. 
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variable from the U.S. federal government election database.14 Detailed definitions of the 
variables are presented in Appendix C. 
2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the annual distribution of our sample. Columns (1) and (2) of the table 
report the number of IPOs and the average first-day return in each year, respectively. The 
number of IPOs in our sample is relatively stable, except during the dot-com bubble and the 
Global Financial Crisis periods. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ritter and Welch 2002), we 
find that the average IPO first-day return exhibits substantial time series variation: in our 
sample, the minimum average IPO first-day return was 0.0669 (in 2008) and the maximum 
average IPO first-day return was 0.6409 (in 1999). 
Further, we separate IPOs into those affected and not affected by terrorist attacks, based 
on whether at least one terrorist attack occurred within the 30-day period prior to the IPO listing 
date. Columns (3) to (6) of Table 1 present the number of IPOs and the average IPO first-day 
return for each of the two groups. To facilitate the comparison, we plot the average IPO first-
day returns of both groups in Figure 1. The results show that the average first-day return of 
IPOs affected by terrorist attacks is 0.1554, while the average first-day return of the nonaffected 
IPOs is 0.2276. Columns (7) and (8) show that the difference between the two values is 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01).15 Further, the table shows that, for all the years, the 
average first-day return was consistently lower for the IPOs that were affected by terrorist 
attacks and that for the vast majority of the years, the differences between the two groups are 
statistically significant. For completeness, we also report descriptive statistics of IPO-level 
controls for both affected and non-affected IPOs in Panel A of Appendix D. 
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
 
14 Available at https://www.usa.gov/election and https://www.senate.gov/reference/Index/Elections.htm. 
15 All reported p-values are for two-tailed tests. 
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Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables. The table shows that the mean 
IPO first-day return in our sample is 0.2172. The table also shows that 14.36% of the IPOs in 
our sample had at least one terrorist attack in the pre-IPO 30-day period. The summary statistics 
of the control variables are largely consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bajo et al. 2016; Bajo 
and Raimondo 2017; Colack et al. 2017; Chemmanur and Yan 2017). Table 3 presents the 
correlation matrix of the variables. The table shows that the IPO first-day return is negatively 
correlated with the terrorist attack dummy; correlations with control variables are largely 
consistent with prior literature.16  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
3. Terrorist Attacks and IPO First-Day Returns 
3.1 Baseline Analysis 
In this section, we examine the effect of terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns using 
regression analysis. Our baseline regression specification is as follows: 
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(1) 
where i denotes the IPO firm, t denotes the year, Industry denotes the IPO firm’s industry fixed 
effects based on Fama-French 48 industries, Year denotes year fixed effects, State denotes the 
IPO firm’s state fixed effects based on the location of the firm’s headquarters, and ε is the error 
 
16 For breviety, we only report the summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables in the baseline 




term. The model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), with standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity.17 
We report the results in Table 4 using a set of nested models. Column (1) presents the 
results with industry, year, and state fixed effects but without control variables; column (2) 
presents the results after controlling for IPO-level control variables; and column (3) presents 
the results of a fully specified baseline model (Equation (1)) with both IPO-level and economy-
wide controls included. In all three columns, the coefficient of Attack is significantly negative 
(largest p-value < 0.01), suggesting that IPOs with terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period, on 
average, experience lower first-day returns compared to nonaffected IPOs. The effect is 
economically meaningful: the coefficient estimate of Attack reported in column (3) suggests 
that the first-day return of an IPO listed within 30-day period following terrorist attacks is, on 
average, 7.61 percentage points lower than that of an IPO not affected by the attacks. The 
coefficient estimates of the control variables are broadly consistent with prior literature. 
Overall, our baseline results are consistent with the notion that, by inducing negative sentiment 
among investors, terrorist attacks adversely affect IPO valuations, resulting in lower IPO first-
day returns. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
3.2 Sensitivity Tests 
To assess the robustness of our baseline results, we conduct an array of sensitivity tests 
and report the results in Table 5. For brevity, we only report the coefficient estimate of Attack; 
control variables and fixed effects are included in all tests. 
 
17 We include state fixed effects based on location of the IPO firm’s headquarters to control for potential effects 
of state-level clustering of terrorist attacks (LaFre et al. 2014). In untabulated robustness test, we re-estimate our 
baseline regression model with state fixed effects based on the state in which IPO firm is incorporated. Using this 
alternative specification of state fixed effects leaves our  core results intact. We also verify that our core results 
remain intact when we use standard errors clustered by terrorist attack. 
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We begin by considering potential alternative mechanisms driving our findings. Prior 
research suggests that the level of IPO firm visibility is positively associated with IPO returns 
(Cook et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2014). Terrorist attacks can garner all the attention of the mass 
media, thereby reducing the level of media coverage devoted to IPO firms and adversely 
affecting IPO firm visibility. Accordingly, if the documented effect of terrorist attacks is driven 
by the visibility channel, it should become insignificant once we control for IPO firm visibility. 
To examine this issue, we include the following visibility measures as additional controls 
(Grullon et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2014): pre-IPO media coverage, IPO-day 
media coverage, and IPO firm advertising intensity. We collect the media coverage data from 
RavenPack database which has been widely used in recent finance and accounting research 
(e.g., Dang et al. 2015; Bushman et al. 2017; You et al. 2018). We calculate pre-IPO (IPO-day) 
media coverage as the log-transformed number of news articles about the IPO firm during the 
30-day window prior to (on the) IPO day and we calculate IPO firm advertising intensity as the 
ratio of the firm’s advertising expenses over sales at the time of listing.18 The sample size for 
these tests is smaller than the one used in our baseline analysis because RavenPack starts its 
coverage in 2000 and some IPOs have missing data for advertising intensity in the year of 
listing. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 5 and show that the coefficient of Attack 
remains significantly negative in all three tests (largest p-value < 0.01).19 
Second, we consider the possibility that our results are conflated by self-selection—
namely, that, in our sample, IPO firms with certain characteristics are more likely to end up 
 
18 We exclude duplicate entries using RavanPack’s even similarity key and only include news articles with a 
relevant score of 100 to ensure that the firm is the main subject of the news article.. 
19 The negative coefficients of media coverage controls are consistent with the results reported in Chen et al. 
(2020). Chen et al. (2020) describe two distinct channels through which media coverage may affect IPO first-day 
return: (1) information asymmetry reduction channel and (2) visibility enhancement channel. The information 
asymmetry reduction channel suggests that higher pre-IPO media coverage alleviates informational frictions 
among the parties involved in an IPO, resulting in lower IPO first-day returns. The visibility enhancement 
mechanism suggests that, by attracting retail investor attention to a new issue in the aftermarket trading, higher 
pre-IPO media coverage leads to higher IPO first-day return. Similar to our study, Chen et al. (2020) document 
negative relation between media coverage and IPO first-day return, concluding that information asymmetry 
reduction mechanism dominates the media coverage-IPO first-day return relation. 
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being listed within the 30-day window following a terrorist attack. As discussed, the exogenous 
nature of terrorist attacks alleviates such concerns. Nonetheless, to examine this issue, we 
conduct three tests. First, we construct a propensity score–matched sample in which we match 
each IPO affected by terrorist attacks with a nonaffected IPO with the closest propensity score. 
The matching is based on a propensity score calculated using all the firm-level control variables 
in Equation (1), as well as industry, year, and state fixed effects. Second, we only include IPOs 
affected by terrorist attacks and IPOs not affected by any terrorist attack with issuance dates 
within the 30-day window prior to a terrorist attack in the analysis. Third, we construct a 
propensity score–matched sample in which we match each IPO affected by terrorist attacks 
with an IPO not affected by any terrorist attack with issuance date within the 30-day window 
prior to a terrorist attack. We match based on the closest propensity score calculated in the 
same way as in the first test. For completeness, we report the descriptive statistics of the 
affected and non-affected IPOs in these samples in Panels B and C of the Appendix D. The 
results are presented in Panel B of Table 5 and show that the coefficient of Attack remains 
significantly negative in all three tests (largest p-value = 0.027).  
Third, we examine whether our findings are robust to alternative windows in defining the 
terrorist attack dummy. As discussed, we construct Attack indicator using a 30-day window. 
To verify that our findings are not driven by this specific choice of time window, we consider 
three alternative measures of Attack based on 15-day, 45-day, and 60-day windows, 
respectively and use each of these alterative measures as our explanatory variable of interest. 
The results are reported in Panel C of Table 5 and show that the coefficient of Attack remains 
significantly negative in all three tests (largest p-value = 0.013).  
Fourth, we decompose IPO first-day return into its primary market component (i.e., the 
difference between first-day opening price and offer price scaled by offer price) and the 
secondary market component (i.e., the difference between the first-day closing price and first-
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day opening price scaled by first-day opening price). The results are reported in Panel D of 
Table 5, which shows that the coefficient of Attack is significantly negative for the primary 
market component (p-value < 0.01) while is statistically insignificant for the secondary market 
component (p-value = 0.317). These results suggest that the effect of terrorist attacks on IPO 
first-day return is driven by the primary market component, consistent with the sentiment-based 
IPO pricing theories (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. 2006) in which issuers set the offer price based on 
their anticipation of retail investor sentiment on the secondary market. Specifically, as 
discussed earlier, sentiment-based IPO pricing theories maintain that the investment banker 
partially adjusts the offer price to reflect the bullish sentiment of retail investors, allowing the 
issuer to benefit from a higher valuation than appropriate, given the intrinsic value of the issue. 
In turn, institutional investors benefit from selling their allocations on the secondary market to 
retail investors, who have higher valuations. Accordingly, when retail investor sentiment 
experiences a positive (negative) shock, the investment banker adjusts the offer price upwards 
(downwards) but not to the full extent of the effect of retail investor sentiment change on IPO 
price on the secondary market.   
Fifth, we consider the possibility that our results are driven by IPO firms whose 
fundamentals could be directly affected by terrorist attacks. To examine this issue, we repeat 
our analysis after excluding IPOs in the transportation and tourism industries, industries that 
could be adversely affected by terrorist attacks. The results of this estimation are presented in 
Panel E of Table and show that the coefficient of Attack remains significantly negative (p-value 
= 0.026). 
Last, we examine the sensitivity of our findings to alternative specifications of terrorist 
attacks. To that end, we extend our sample by including mass shooting events from the Stanford 
Mass Shootings of America (MSA) database.20 The MSA defines a mass shooting as three or 
 
20 Available at  https://library.stanford.edu/projects/mass-shootings-america. 
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more shooting victims (not necessarily fatalities), not including the shooter, and the shooting 
must not be gang, drug, or organized crime related. The results of this analysis are reported in 
Panel F of Table 5, showing that the coefficient of Attack remains significantly negative (p-
value = 0.010). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 To further gauge the robustness of our findings, we conduct four untabulated tests.  In 
the first test, we consider the possibility that terrorist attacks cause issuers to withdraw an IPO 
in order to return to the IPO market in a later stage when market conditions improve. We expect 
the impact of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO withdrawal decision to be limited, given evidence 
in prior literature showing that prior withdrawals increase the perceived riskiness of the second-
time IPOs and result in significantly lower valuations of such IPOs (Dunbar and Foerster 2008; 
Lian and Wang 2009). Morevover, such an effect, if present in our sample, would bias against 
finding significant effect of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO first-day return, as withdrawn IPOs 
are likely to be the ones mostly affected by the deterioration in market conditions induced by 
terrorist attacks.  
Nevertheless, to examine this issue in our sample, we compare the relative frequency of 
IPOs in the 30-day window following terrorist attack with (1) the relative frequency of IPOs in 
the [+31,+60] day window following the attack and (2) the relative frequency of IPOs in the [-
31,-1] day window preceding the attack. If terrorist attacks cause issuers to withdraw IPOs, 
IPO frequency in the 30-day window following the attack should be significantly lower 
compared to IPO frequencies in the adjacent non-attack 30-day windows. The results of our 
analysis lend no support to this conjecture: among the 3,683 successful IPOs in our sample, 
529 (14.36%) are in the 30-day window following terrorist attack, 475 (12.89%) are in the 
[+31,+60] day non-attack window, and 405 (11.00%) are in the [-31,-1] day non-attack window. 
To further investigate this issue, we identify 2,096 withdrawn IPOs during our sample period 
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from the SDC Platinum database. We reason that, if terrorist attacks cause issuers to withdraw 
IPOs, frequency of withdrawn IPOs in the 30-day window following the attack should be 
significantly higher compared to withdrawn IPO frequencies in the adjacent non-attack 30-day 
windows. Among withdrawn IPOs during our sample period, 277 (13.22%) are in the 30-day 
window following terrorist attack, 246 (11.74%) are in the [+31,+60] day non-attack window, 
and 294 IPOs (14.03%) are in the [-31,-1] day non-attack window. We find no significant 
differences between the estimated frequencies of withdrawn IPOs in the attack versus non-
attack windows. Collectively, the results of these analyses suggest that our findings are unlikely 
to be affected by IPO withdrawals. 
In the second test, we consider the possibility that our findings could be limited for IPOs 
affiliated with a certain industry. To examine this issue, we perform industry-by-industry 
analysis based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification. Notwithstanding a substantial 
reduction in the sample size used to estimate these industry-level regressions, we find that the 
coefficient of Attack is significantly negative at the 10% level or better for most of the industries 
in our sample, suggesting that our results are not confined to a single industry. 
In the third test, we consider the effect of price stabilization on the documented 
relationship. Notably, such an effect would bias against finding significant effect of terrorist 
attacks on IPO underpricing. Nonetheless, to examine this issue, we estimate our baseline 
regression model using four-week initial return (the difference between closing price four 
weeks after the IPO listing day and offer price, scaled by the offer price) as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient of Attack remains significantly negative in this estimation (p-value < 
0.01), reinforcing the robustness of our findings. 
Lastly, we examine the possibility that our results are spuriously driven by the underlying 
data, namely, that the documented effect of terrorist attacks is identified in our setting by sheer 
chance. To help dispel this concern, we run a series of placebo tests. For each IPO in our sample, 
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we assign a “pseudo” attack dummy by sampling from a Bernoulli distribution with probability 
0.1436, which is the proportion of IPOs with pre-IPO terrorist attacks in our sample—i.e., the 
probability of a randomly chosen IPO in our sample being included in the terrorist attack 
treatment group. We then re-estimate our baseline model (Equation (1)) using the pseudo 
Attack variable instead of the actual Attack variable, repeat the process 1,000 times, and 
compare coefficient estimate of the actual Attack variable to the distribution of the pseudo-
coefficient estimates. The (untabulated) results indicate that the distribution of pseudo-
coefficients is centered around zero (mean = -0.001, median = -0.0009) and that 99% of the 
pseudo-coefficient estimates lie between -0.056 and 0.04. A comparison of these results to our 
actual coefficient estimate of -0.0761 (see column (3) of Table 4) indicates that actual 
coefficient of Attack  lies in the very extreme left tail of the distribution of pseudo-coefficients, 
suggesting that our results are unlikely to stem from spurious correlations in our sample. 
 
4. Terrorist Attacks, Investor Beliefs, and IPO Firms’ Fundamentals 
Prior research defines investor sentiment as beliefs about future cash flows and 
investment risks that are not justified by the facts at hand—namely, beliefs about asset values 
unwarranted by fundamentals (Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007; Dorn 2009). Building on this 
definition, the investor sentiment perspective implies that terrorist attacks negatively influence 
investors’ subjective beliefs about IPO firms’ prospects, but not IPO firms’ fundamentals. 
Accordingly, we should observe the following two patterns: (1) a positive association between 
incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period and the degree of pessimism in investors’ 
beliefs and (2) no direct effect of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period on operating 
performance in the post-IPO period. In this section, we examine the empirical validity of these 
two predictions in our sample. 
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4.1 Terrorist Attacks and Investor Beliefs 
Prior studies highlight the role of media tone in shaping investors’ perceptions and beliefs 
(Tetlock 2007; Dougal et al. 2012; Garcia 2013). Building on this literature, we use the tone of 
media articles covering an IPO firm to gauge investors’ prevailing beliefs regarding its 
prospects. Since we posit that pre-IPO terrorist attacks adversely affect investor sentiment, we 
expect IPOs with terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period, on average, to have a more pessimistic 
media tone in the period following the attacks, compared to nonaffected IPOs. 
 Following prior literature (e.g., Dang et al. 2015; Bushman et al. 2017), we obtain media 
tone data from the RavenPack database. Since the coverage of RavenPack starts in 2000, we 
focus on IPOs from 2000 to 2016 for this analysis. This leaves us with 293 IPOs affected by 
terrorist attacks. Next, we construct a propensity score–matched sample in which we match 
each IPO affected by terrorist attacks with a nonaffected IPO, which gives us an initial sample 
of 586 IPOs. The propensity score is calculated in the same way as in Panel B of Table 5. Lastly, 
for each affected IPO, we collect news articles about the IPO firm for the period from the day 
of the attack to the day of the listing. We use the same time window to collect news articles for 
the matched nonaffected IPO firm. Since some IPOs do not have any news articles in 
RavenPack, we focus only on IPOs with media coverage data available from RavenPack. This 
leaves us with a final sample of 536 IPOs. 
We employ the RavenPack event sentiment score (ESS) to capture the tone of the news 
articles about the IPO firms. The ESS score captures the informational content of news events 
based on proprietary algorithms developed by RavenPack. These algorithms combine 
traditional language analysis and ratings of experts with extensive experience in linguistics, 
finance, and economics to determine the quantified sentiment score for each news event (Dang 
et al. 2015). The score ranges from zero (extremely negative tone) to 100 (extremely positive 
tone), where 50 represents a neutral tone. Following Bushman et al. (2017), we transform the 
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ESS by assigning a value of 1 if the ESS is greater than 50, a value of -1 if the ESS is less than 
50, and a value of zero if the ESS is equal to 50. The number of negative articles (Negative 
articles) is calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of news articles about the IPO 
firm with a transformed ESS of -1 from the day of the terrorist attack up to the listing date. The 
number of positive articles (Positive articles) is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
number of news articles about the IPO firm with a transformed ESS of 1 from the day of the 
terrorist attack up to the listing date. In addition, we construct the average media tone (Average 
tone), calculated as the average value of the transformed ESS among all the news articles about 
the IPO firm from the day of the terrorist attack up to the listing date.21 We then re-estimate 
the regression specification in Equation (1) three times, using each of the aforementioned three 
media tone variables as the dependent variable, respectively. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6. Column (1) shows that the coefficient 
of Attack in the Negative articles regression is significantly positive (p-value < 0.01), 
suggesting that IPOs affected by terrorist attacks, on average, have more news articles with a 
negative tone, compared to nonaffected IPOs. Column (2) shows that the coefficient of Attack 
in the Positive articles regression is significantly negative (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that 
IPOs affected by terrorist attacks, on average, have fewer news articles with a positive tone, 
compared to nonaffected IPOs. Reinforcing these results, column (3) shows that the coefficient 
of Attack in the Average tone regression is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting 
that IPOs affected by terrorist attacks, on average, have a more pessimistic media tone, 
compared to nonaffected IPOs. Taken within the context of prior research (Tetlock 2007; 
Dougal et al. 2012; Garcia 2013), these findings are consistent with pre-IPO terrorist attacks 
eliciting more pessimistic beliefs regarding the IPO firms’ prospects. 
 
21 The average IPO in our sample has 9.71 news articles in the post-attack/pre-listing day period. Out of these, 
60.2% are articles with positive tone (transformed ESS = 1), 26.3% are articles with negative tone (transformed 
ESS = -1), and 13.5% are articles with neutral tone (transformed ESS = 0). 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2 Terrorist Attacks and Post-IPO Operating Performance 
As discussed above, we document that pre-IPO terrorist attacks have a negative impact 
on media sentiment regarding IPO firms, and we ascribe this finding to terrorist attacks 
adversely affecting investors’ subjective beliefs and expectations regarding the IPO firms’ 
prospects. If our interpretation is valid, we should find no direct effect of pre-IPO terrorist 
attacks on the post-IPO operating performance of issuing firms. To gauge this, we define the 
return on assets in the first year (ROA_1Y), second year (ROA_2Y), and third year (ROA_3Y) 
as net income divided by total assets at the end of the first, second, and third year, respectively, 
after the IPO year. Then, we regress each of the three operating performance measures on the 
Attack variable and controls, which include control variables used in our baseline model 
(Equation (1)) and a set of control variables suggested in prior studies examining post-IPO 
performance (e.g., Jain and Kini 1994; Krishnan et al. 2011). The latter include First-day 
return, Managerial ownership, Price revision and Market value with the detailed defitions of 
these variables provided in Appendix C.    
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. The coefficient of the Attack variable 
is not significant in any of the three regression models (smallest p-value = 0.289). Accordingly, 
we find no evidence that issuing firms with terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period exhibit poorer 
post-IPO operating performance.22 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 Taken together, the results reported in this section suggest that (1) pre-IPO terrorist 
attacks lead to a decline in media sentiment following the attacks and (2) the decline in media 
sentiment cannot be ascribed to an adverse effect of terrorist attacks on the fundamentals of the 
 
22 As a robustness test, we repeat this analysis using a propensity score-matched sample. The results of this 
estimation (untabulated for brevity) remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7.  
 
26 
issuing firms. Collectively, these findings provide support for investor sentiment as the 
mechanism driving our findings. 
 
5. Cross-Sectional Tests 
5.1 Hard-to-Value IPOs 
Prior literature suggests that the magnitude of the impact of investor sentiment on stock 
prices varies in the cross section of firms. Specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) argue 
that the stocks of firms with a higher level of uncertainty—for example, young firms, firms 
with low profitability, and firms with a high proportion of intangible assets—are more difficult 
to value, making biases more insidious and valuation mistakes more likely. Applying these 
insights to our setting, we expect the documented effect of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO 
first-day returns to be amplified for IPO firms with low profitability and a high proportion of 
intangible assets, and mitigated for mature IPO firms. 
 To test these predictions, we construct three variables capturing the aforementioned 
IPO firm characteristics. We construct Low Profitability as an indicator variable equal to one 
if Profitability is in the bottom quartile of the IPOs listed in the same year as the focal IPO; 
Firm age as the natural logarithm of the difference between the year of listing and the year the 
firm was founded; and Intangibility as one minus the ratio of property, plant, and equipment 
over total assets. We interact the three variables with the Attack variable and include the 
interaction terms separately in the regression specification in Equation (1). 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8. Column (1) shows that the coefficient 
of the Attack×Firm Age interaction term is positive and marginally significant (p-value = 
0.085), suggesting that the effect of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns is 
mitigated for more mature IPO firms. Columns (2) and (3) report that the coefficients of the 
Attack×Low Profitability and Attack×Intangibility interaction terms are both significantly 
negative (largest p-value = 0.016). These results suggest that the negative effect of pre-IPO 
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terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns is amplified for IPO firms with low profitability and 
IPO firms with a greater proportion of intangible assets. Collectively, these findings provide 
support for our conjecture that greater valuation uncertainty magnifies the negative impact of 
terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns, consistent with investor sentiment channel driving 
our findings. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.2 Third-Party Certification 
Prior research suggests that the presence of prestigious intermediaries (e.g., underwriters 
with a strong reputation and Big 4 auditing firms) and venture capitalists as investors plays an 
important certification role for a new issue, reducing the information uncertainty faced by the 
market (Booth and Smith 1986; Carter and Manaster 1990; Megginson and Weiss 1991; Menon 
and Williams 1991; Michaely and Shaw 1994; Bajo et al. 2016). Further, prior research (e.g., 
Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007) maintains that the stocks of firms with a higher level of 
information uncertainty are more succeptible to investor sentiment. Integrating these two 
insights together, we reason that the effect of terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns is weaker 
for IPOs with greater levels of certification. 
Following prior literature (Bajo et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2020), we employ three measures 
of IPO certification. Underwriter reputation (Underwriter) is the reputation rank of the lead 
underwriter at the time of listing, based on the updated Carter and Manaster (1990) 
classification. The Big 4 auditor dummy (Big 4 auditor) is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the IPO firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise. The venture capital 
dummy (VC back) is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO firm is backed by a venture 
capital firm, and zero otherwise. We interact the three variables with Attack and include the 
interaction terms separately in the regression specification in Equation (1).   
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The results of this analysis are reported in Table 9. Column (1) shows that the coefficient 
of the Attack×Underwriter interaction term is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), 
suggesting that the negative effect of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns is 
mitigated if the IPO is underwritten by a reputable underwriter. Columns (2) and (3) show that 
the coefficients of the Attack×Big 4 auditor and Attack×VC back interaction terms are both 
significantly positive (largest p-value < 0.01). These results suggest that the effect of pre-IPO 
terrorist attacks on IPO first-day returns is attenuated if the IPO firm is audited by a Big 4 
auditor or if an IPO firm is backed by a venture capital firm. Collectively, the results reported 
in Table 9 suggest that IPO certification mitigates the negative impact of pre-IPO terrorist 
attacks on IPO first-day returns, lending further support for the investor sentiment channel as 
the mechanism driving our findings. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.3 Salience of Terrorist Attacks 
Evidence from prior literature (e.g., Galea et al. 2002; Hughes et al. 2011) suggests that 
the impact of a negative event on individuals’ beliefs and behaviors is amplified with the 
salience of the event. Accordingly, we reason that the impact of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on 
investor sentiment—and thus the negative effect of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO first-day 
returns—should be amplified when the attacks are more salient to investors. 
We measure the salience of the terrorist attacks using the following variables. The 
number of fatalities (Num fatalities) is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of 
victims killed in the attacks. Terrorist attacks with greater numbers of fatalities attract more 
attention from the media and the general public (Kearns et al. 2019), making these attacks more 
salient to investors. The number of attacks (Num attacks) is the number of terrorist attacks in 
the 30-day period prior to the listing date. We reason that greater numbers of attacks in the pre-
IPO window could magnify investor attention on terrorist attacks. The financial center attack 
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indicator variable (Financial center attack) is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one of 
the terrorist attacks took place at one of the financial centers or Washington, DC, and zero 
otherwise.23 We reason that terrorist attacks that take place at financial centers are likely to 
attract more attention from investors in other locations. We further conjecture that terrorist 
attacks that take place closer to the IPO date should have a greater impact on IPO investor 
sentiment. We measure time proximity to the attack (Time proximity) as -1 times the natural 
logarithm of the number of days between the closest terrorist attack date and the IPO date. 
Finally, since retail investors—that is, investors who are more likely to be sentiment driven 
(Ljungqvist et al. 2006)—tend to focus on the stocks of locally headquartered firms (Seasholes 
and Zhu 2010; Korniotis and Kumar 2013), we reason that the negative effect of pre-IPO 
terrorist attacks should be magnified for attacks that take place in geographic proximity to the 
IPO firms’ headquarters. We measure the geographic proximity of attacks (Distance proximity) 
as -1 times the geographic distance between the location of the closest terrorist attack and the 
headquarters of the IPO firm. 
We include the aforementioned five variables as the explanatory variables of interest in 
the regression specification in Equation (1). Since we can examine the salience of terrorist 
attack only for IPOs with terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period, we restrict the sample to IPOs 
with at least one terrorist attack within the 30-day period prior to the IPO listing date (i.e., IPOs 
with Attack = 1). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10. Columns (1) and (2) 
show that coefficients of the Num attacks and Financial center attack variables, respectively, 
are both significantly negative (largest p-value = 0.02), suggesting that IPOs with multiple 
attacks in the pre-IPO period or with pre-IPO attacks that took place at one of the financial 
centers experience lower first-day returns, on average. Column (3) shows that the coefficient 
of the Num fatalities variable is significantly negative (p-value = 0.04), suggesting that IPOs 
 
23 The financial centers in our sample include Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, New York, and Seattle. 
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with more deadly pre-IPO terrorist attacks, on average, experience lower first-day returns.24 
Columns (4) and (5) show that the coefficients of the Time proximity and Distance proximity 
variables are both significantly negative (largest p-value = 0.036), suggesting that IPOs with 
terrorist attacks closer to the IPO date or attacks that take place in geographic proximity to their 
headquarters, on average, experience lower first-day returns. Collectively, the results of this 
analysis support our conjecture that the impact of negative sentiment induced by pre-IPO 
terrorist attacks is amplified for attacks that are more salient to investors. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
6. Supplemental Analysis 
6.1 Post-Listing Day Stock Returns 
In this section, we examine the impact of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on the post-listing day 
stock returns of new issues. Since investor sentiment captures beliefs about asset values 
unwarranted by fundamentals (Dorn 2009), sentiment-driven returns should subsequently 
revert. In our setting, if the first-day returns of the affected IPOs are lowered by a downward 
shift in investor sentiment elicited by pre-IPO terrorist attacks, such an effect should reverse 
itself in the post-listing day period. Therefore, we expect to observe a positive association 
between pre-IPO terrorist attacks and the post-listing day stock returns. To test this prediction, 
we calculate the stock returns over one week (Return_1W), two weeks (Return_2W), and four 
weeks (Return_4W) after the IPO listing date. 25  We then re-estimate the regression 
 
24 In untabulated analysis, we extend our sample to include terrorist attacks without casualties. Using this extended 
sample, we create two dummy variables: (1) Attack_with_fatalities and (2) Attack_without_fatalities and regress 
First-day return on these two dummy variables and controls specified in our baseline model. The coefficient of 
Attack_with_fatalities is -0.0737 (p-value = 0.000), the coefficient of Attack_without_fatalities is -0.018 (p-value 
= 0.214), and the difference between the two coefficients is significantly negative (p-value = 0.019), further 
confirming that the documented effect is amplified for attacks that are more salient to investors. 
25 Our focus on the short-term (weekly) post-listing stock returns is consistent with prior literature suggesting that 
noise traders—and thus, sentiment-driven valuation biases—cannot  survive in the long run (Kogan et al. 2006). 
Relatedly, Gao et al. (2020) note that the lack of evidence on the short-term return predictability using existing 
sentiment proxies constitutes a significant gap in the sentiment literature.  
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specification in Equation (1) three times, using each of the three post-listing day return 
measures as the dependent variable, respectively. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient of Attack is significantly positive in the Return_1W regression model (p-value < 
0.01). Similarly, columns (2) and (3) show that the Attack variable loads positively in 
Return_2W and Return_4W regression models (p-value < 0.01 for Return_2W, p-value = 0.057 
for Return_4W). The results of this analysis suggest that the documented effect of pre-IPO 
attacks on the listing day return reverts in the post-listing day period, lending further support 
for investor sentiment as the mechanism underpinning our findings. 
 [Insert Table 11 here] 
6.2 Other IPO Outcomes 
In this section, we extend our analysis beyond the IPO first-day return by examining the 
impact of terrorist attacks on a set of alternative measures of IPO performance studied in prior 
literature (e.g., Benveniste and Wilhelm 1990; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003; Cook et al. 2006; 
Wang and Yung 2015), which includes price revision, oversubscription, total proceeds, and 
primary share revision. Sentiment-based IPO pricing models stipulate that underwriters set the 
final offer price to reflect investor bullishness in early aftermarket trading (Cook et al. 2006). 
Therefore, we expect the negative shocks to investor sentiment induced by terrorist attacks to 
result in lower price revisions. We further reason that, to the extent that IPO oversubscription 
captures the ex ante demand for an IPO (Jenkinson and Jones 2004), a decline in investor 
sentiment induced by terrorist attacks should reduce the likelihood of the affected IPOs being 
oversubscribed, as investors in the primary IPO market would expect lower returns from 
flipping shares to retail investors on the first day of trading. Following similar reasoning, we 
expect that pre-IPO terrorist attacks result in lower total proceeds and lower primary share 
revisions for the affected new issues.  
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Construction of the variables used in this analysis follows prior literature (Bradley and 
Jordan 2002; Lowry and Schwert 2004; Cook et al. 2006; Wang and Yung 2015). We calculate 
price revision (Price revision) as the difference between the IPO offer price and the mid-point 
of the initial filing range, divided by the mid-point of the initial filing range. We construct the 
oversubscription dummy (Oversubscription) as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the total volume 
of orders in the underwiting book exceeds the number of shares offered and zero otherwise as 
indicated by the SDC Platinum oversubscription flag. We calculate total proceeds (Proceeds) 
as the number of shares issued times the final offer price divided by the total assets of the 
issuing firm. We calculate primary share revision (Primary share revision) as the difference 
between the number of primary shares offered and the number of primary shares filed, divided 
by the total number of shares filed. We re-estimate the regression specification in Equation (1) 
four times, using each of the four aforementioned variables as the dependent variable, 
respectively.  
We present the results of this analysis in Table 12 which shows that the coefficient of 
Attack is significantly negative in all four regression models (largest p-value = 0.023). These 
results suggest that IPOs affected by terrorist attacks have lower price revisions, lower 
proceeds, lower primary share revisions, and are less likely to be oversubscribed by investors. 
Coupled with the documented negative effect of terrorist attacks on IPO first-day return, these 
findings suggest that terrorist attacks have two distinct effects. First, issuing firms affected by 
terrorist attacks are less aggressive when setting IPO offer prices. Second, notwithstanding less 
aggressive offer prices, IPO investors are less “bullish” and do not bid up post-IPO prices of 
the issuing firms affected by terrorist attacks to the same extent as they would in the absence 
of a terrorist attack.26  
 
26 The negative impact of pre-IPO terrorist attacks on IPO proceeds is notable, given the results reported in Table 
7 showing (1) the lack of a significant direct effect of the attacks on post-IPO operating performance and (2) a 
positive association between IPO proceeds and post-IPO operating performance. Collectively, these findings 
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[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
7. Conclusions 
Utilizing incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period as exogenous shocks to 
investor sentiment, we study the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. We find that 
IPOs listed within 30-day period following the attacks, on average, experience lower first-day 
returns. We also find that pre-IPO terrorist attacks are associated with a more negative media 
tone of the articles covering the IPO, but not with post-IPO operating performance. In a cross-
sectional analysis, we find that the documented effect of attacks is amplified for hard-to-value 
IPOs, mitigated for IPOs with reputable intermediaries, and magnified by the salience of the 
attacks. Further, we show that terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period are associated with higher 
post-listing day stock returns, consistent with sentiment-driven return reversals. We also find 
that affected IPOs have lower price revisions, total proceeds, primary share revisions, and are 
less likely to be oversubscribed. Collectively, our results are consistent with terrorist attacks 
inducing negative shocks to investor sentiment, resulting in lower demand for new offerings 
and lower IPO valuations. 
 Our paper contributes to the emerging stream of research examining the role of investor 
sentiment in IPO pricing. Providing causal inferences on this relation is challenged by the latent 
nature of the sentiment construct and substantial endogeneity issues. We tackle these 
challenges by using incidences of terrorist attacks in the pre-IPO period as exogenous shocks 
to investor sentiment. Our paper also contributes to the literature examining the impact of 
terrorism on financial market outcomes and corporate policies. While studies in this stream of 
research predominantly focus on the economy-wide effects of terrorism, we provide evidence 
of the micro-level (firm-level) impact of terrorist attacks in the IPO setting. Lastly, our findings 
 
suggest that, while having no direct effect on the IPO firms’ fundamentals, a decline in investor sentiment induced 
by terrorist attacks impacts post-IPO performance indirectly by reducing IPO proceeds. 
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have policy implications, suggesting that regulators consider the adverse effects of terrorist 
attacks on firms’ abilities to raise external funds, when forming economic policies.  
We conclude by highlighting potential avenues for future research. Similar to other 
studies (e.g., Edmans et al. 2007; Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007; Wang and Young 2020), we 
do not measure investor sentiment directly since doing so in a large-scale archival study such 
as ours would not be feasible. Future studies could explore the interplay between investor 
sentiment and IPO underpricing using experimental research design, whereby sentiment could 
potentially be induced and measured in a controlled environment. Also, in line with prior 
studies (e.g., Wang and Young 2020) our study focuses on terrorist attacks that took place in 
the U.S. Future research could fruitfully extend our analysis by examining a panel of IPOs and 
terrorist attacks from different countries. Such an analysis would provide useful insights on the 
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List of Terrorist Attacks 
 
 Target Attack date 
No. of 
casualties 
Attack city Attack state 
No. of IPOs 
affected 
1 Van carrying rabbinical students, Brooklyn Bridge 1-Mar-1994 1 New York City New York 35 
2 Unabomber—Thomas Mosser 10-Dec-1994 1 Caldwell New Jersey 10 
3 Planned Parenthood Clinic 30-Dec-1994 2 Brookline Massachusetts 9 
4 Alfred P. Murray Federal Building 19-Apr-1995 168 Oklahoma City Oklahoma 16 
5 Gilbert Murray—Gilbert Murray 24-Apr-1995 1 Sacramento California 15 
6 Olympic Park bombing 27-Jul-1996 1 Atlanta Georgia 36 
7 Empire State Building 23-Feb-1997 1 New York City New York 22 
8 Abortion clinic bombing 29-Jan-1998 1 Birmingham Alabama 26 
9 U.S. Capitol Building 24-Jul-1998 2 Washington DC District of Columbia 17 
10 Barnett Slepian murder 23-Oct-1998 1 Amherst New York 5 
11 Columbine High School 20-Apr-1999 15 Littleton Colorado 23 
12 Korean Methodist Church 4-Jul-1999 2 Bloomington Indiana 35 
13 Bank of America, Plaza Building 5-Jan-2002 1 Tampa Florida 2 
14 Los Angeles International Airport 4-Jul-2002 3 Los Angeles California 4 
15 Seattle Jewish Federation 28-Jul-2006 1 Seattle Washington 4 
16 Virginia Tech. Shooting 16-Apr-2007 32 Blacksburg Virginia 19 
17 Knoxville Unitarian Church 27-Jul-2008 2 Knoxville Tennessee 1 
18 Immigration center 3-Apr-2009 13 Binghamton New York 2 
19 Late term abortion doctor - Dr. George Tiller 31-May-2009 1 Wichita Kansas 3 
20 Military recruiting station 1-Jun-2009 1 Little Rock Arkansas 4 
21 The National Holocaust Museum 10-Jun-2009 1 Washington DC District of Columbia 3 
22 Military Personnel, Fort Hood 5-Nov-2009 13 Killeen Texas 6 
23 Internal Revenue Service Building 18-Feb-2010 2 Austin Texas 2 
24 Pentagon Building 4-Mar-2010 1 Arlington Virginia 9 
25 Discovery Communications Headquarters 1-Sep-2010 1 Silver Spring Maryland 3 
26 Movie theater, Aurora 20-Jul-2012 12 Aurora Colorado 12 
27 Sikh temple 5-Aug-2012 7 Oak Creek Wisconsin 6 
28 Sandy Hook School 14-Dec-2012 12 Sandy Hook Connecticut 1 
29 Boston Marathon 15-Apr-2013 3 Boston Massachusetts 16 
 
40 
30 Security officer while pursuing Boston Marathon Bombers 18-Apr-2013 1 Cambridge Massachusetts 17 
31 Navy Yard 16-Sep-2013 12 Washington DC DC 31 
32 Terminal 3, Los Angeles Airport 1-Nov-2013 1 Los Angeles California 18 
33 Jewish retirement home 13-Apr-2014 3 Overland Park Kansas 15 
34 Civilian shooting, Seattle 27-Apr-2014 1 Seattle Washington 15 
35 Civilian shooting, Seattle 1-Jun-2014 2 Seattle Washington 24 
36 Police officer shooting, Las Vegas 8-Jun-2014 5 Las Vegas Nevada 23 
37 Blooming Grove Barracks 12-Sep-2014 1 Blooming Grove Pennsylvania 24 
38 Police officer shooting, New York 20-Dec-2014 2 New York City New York 2 
39 Civilian shooting, Chapel Hill 10-Feb-2015 3 Chapel Hill North Carolina 8 
40 African Methodist Episcopal Church, Charleston 17-Jun-2015 9 Charleston South Carolina 26 
41 Navy recruiting station 16-Jul-2015 6 Chattanooga Tennessee 20 
42 Movie theatre, Lafayette 23-Jul-2015 3 Lafayette Louisiana 15 
43 Umpqua Community College shooting 1-Oct-2015 9 Roseburg Oregon 12 
44 Planned Parenthood shooting 27-Nov-2015 3 Colorado Springs Colorado 2 
45 Holiday party 2-Dec-2015 16 San Bernardino California 2 
46 Nightclub 12-Jun-2016 50 Orlando Florida 4 
47 Police officer shooting, Dallas 7-Jul-2016 6 Dallas Texas 12 
48 Police officer shooting, Bristol 7-Jul-2016 1 Bristol Tennessee 12 








SDC Platinum sample from January 1, 1994, to December 31, 2016 13,453 
Less withdrawn or postponed IPOs 2,096 
Less duplicate CUSIP entries or firm name 1,729 
Less foreign listings, closed-end funds, rights offerings, and unit offerings 3,487 
Less IPOs with missing offer price or offer price less than $1.00 452 
Less IPOs with missing listing day returns or missing value for any of the control variables 1,827 
Less IPO firms with negative leverage, sales, or market-to-book ratio 179 









Variables in the baseline regression (Table 4) 
First-day return IPO first-day closing price minus offer price, scaled by offer price. 
Attack 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was a terrorist attack 30 days prior to the listing 
date, and 0 otherwise. 
Offer size Natural logarithm of total proceeds raised, in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Profitability 
Earnings before interest and tax divided by the total assets of the IPO firm at the 
time of listing. 
Asset turnover Sales divided by the total assets of the IPO firm at the time of listing. 
Market-to-book 
Market value of assets divided by the book value of the assets of the IPO firm at the 
time of listing. 
Leverage Total debt divided by the total assets of the IPO firm at the time of listing. 
Float 
Regular shares issued to the public for trading divided by the total number of 
outstanding shares. 
Shares issued Natural logarithm of regular shares issued to the public for trading. 
Underwriter 
Reputation rank of the lead underwriter at the time of listing, based on the updated 
Carter and Manaster (1990) classification. 
Big 4 auditor 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm, and 
0 otherwise. 
VC back 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm is backed by venture capital, and 0 
otherwise. 
Commitment 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the underwriter guarantees to purchase all the 
securities offered for sale by the issuer regardless of whether they can sell them to 
investors, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm age 
Natural logarithm of the difference between the year of listing and the year the firm 
was founded. 
Equity carve-out 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm is an equity carve-out from another firm, 
and 0 otherwise. 
NASDAQ Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO was listed on the NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. 
Election 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was a senate or presidential election in the 30 
days prior to the listing date, and 0 otherwise. 
Market return Return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 over the three months preceding the offering. 
ΔBusiness confidence Monthly change in the business confidence index. 
ΔConsumer sentiment Monthly change in the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. 
ΔPolicy uncertainty Monthly change in Economic Policy Uncertainty. 
EPS forecast revision 
Average earnings per share (EPS) forecast revision, which is the average revision in 
the analysts’ EPS forecasts scaled by the stock price across all listed firms. 
ΔReal risk premium Monthly change in the real risk premium. 
ΔReal 10 year rate Monthly change in the real 10-year interest rate.  
Additional variables (Table 5) 
Pre-IPO media coverage 
Natural logarithm of the number of news articles about the IPO firm during the 30-
day window prior to IPO day. 
IPO day media coverage Natural logarithm of the number of news articles about the IPO firm on the IPO day. 
Advertising intensity Advertising expenses divided by sales at the time of listing. 
Primary return IPO first-day opening price minus offer price, scaled by offer price. 
Secondary return 
IPO first-day closing price minus first-day opening price, scaled by first-day 
opening price. 
Additional variables (Table 6) 
Negative articles 
Natural logarithm of the number of news articles about the IPO firm from the day 
of the terrorist attack up to the listing date that has a transformed ESS of -1. 
Positive articles 
Natural logarithm of the number of news articles about the IPO firm from the day 
of the terrorist attack up to the listing date that has a transformed ESS of 1. 
Average tone 
Average value of the transformed ESS among all the news articles about the IPO 




Additional variables (Table 7) 
ROA_1Y/2Y/3Y 
Net income divided by total assets at the end of the first/second/third year after 
listing. 
Managerial ownership 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1, if managers retain more than the median 
ownership retention level after the IPO, and 0 otherwise. 
Price revision 
Difference between the IPO offer price and the mid-point of the initial filing range, 
divided by the mid-point of the initial filing range. 
Market value Natural logarithm of market capitalization of the IPO firm.  
Additional variables (Table 8) 
Low profitability 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO firm belongs to the bottom quartile of 
Profitability, and 0 otherwise.  
Intangibility 
One minus the ratio of property, plant, and equipment over the total assets of the 
IPO firm at the time of listing. 
Additional variables (Table 10) 
Num attacks Number of terrorist attacks in the 30-day period prior to the listing date. 
Financial center attack 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one of the terrorist attacks was at one of the 
financial centers or Washington, DC, and 0 otherwise. 
Num fatalities Natural logarithm of one plus the number of victims killed in the terrorist attack.  
Time proximity 
-1 times the natural logarithm of the difference between the date of the terrorist 
attack and the IPO listing date. 
Distance proximity 
-1 times the natural logarithm of the geographic distance between the location of the 
terrorist attack and the headquarters of the IPO firm. 
Additional variable (Table 11) 
Return_1W/2W/4W 
Closing price one/two/four week(s) after the IPO listing day minus the closing price 
on the listing day divided by the closing price on the listing day. 
Additional variables (Table 12) 
Oversubscription 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the total volume of orders in the underwiting book 
exceeds the number of shares offered and zero otherwise.  
Total proceeds Total proceeds raised in the IPO, scaled by total assets at the time of listing. 
Primary share revision 
Difference between the number of primary shares offered and the number of primary 






Comparison of IPO Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
Variable Attack No Attack Diff. t-Stat. 
Offer size 4.1525 4.3254 -0.1729 -3.0533 
Profitability 0.0202 0.0334 -0.0132 -0.8512 
Asset turnover 0.5911 0.6153 -0.0242 -0.7187 
Market-to-book 2.4382 2.4220 0.0161 0.1165 
Leverage 0.2497 0.2244 0.0253 2.0148 
Float 0.4670 0.4657 0.0013 0.1185 
Shares issued 1.9427 1.8164 0.1263 3.3328 
Underwriter 7.2467 7.4990 -0.2522 -2.4758 
Big 4 auditor 0.3728 0.3698 0.0030 0.1409 
VC back 0.3875 0.4084 -0.0208 -0.9088 
Commitment 0.6408 0.8126 -0.1718 -7.8068 
Firm age 2.2528 2.2424 0.0104 0.2140 
Equity carve-out 0.2439 0.1798 0.0641 3.2204 
NASDAQ 0.6503 0.6760 -0.0257 -1.1484 
Obs. 529 3,154   
 
Panel B. Propensity Score-Matched Sample Based on All Nonaffected IPOs 
Variable Attack No Attack Diff. t-Stat. 
Offer size 4.1525 4.2470 -0.0945 -1.3122 
Profitability 0.0202 0.0208 -0.0007 -0.0309 
Asset turnover 0.5911 0.5552 0.0359 0.8451 
Market-to-book 2.4382 2.5301 -0.0919 -0.5266 
Leverage 0.2497 0.2333 0.0163 1.0158 
Float 0.4670 0.4488 0.0182 1.2508 
Shares issued 1.9427 1.8917 0.0511 1.0638 
Underwriter 7.2467 7.4657 -0.2189 -1.6631 
Big 4 auditor 0.3728 0.3705 0.0023 0.0818 
VC back 0.3875 0.4093 -0.0218 -0.7181 
Commitment 0.6408 0.6465 -0.0057 -0.1924 
Firm age 2.2528 2.1956 0.0572 0.9275 
Equity carve-out 0.2439 0.2300 0.0138 0.5409 
NASDAQ 0.6503 0.6673 -0.0170 -0.5831 
Obs. 529 529   
 
Panel C. 30-Day Pre- and Post-Attack Sample 
Variable Attack No Attack Diff. t-Stat. 
Offer size 4.1525 4.1284 0.0241 0.3074 
Profitability 0.0202 0.0420 -0.0219 -1.0642 
Asset turnover 0.5911 0.5757 0.0154 0.3467 
Market-to-book 2.4382 2.3767 0.0615 0.3217 
Leverage 0.2497 0.2556 -0.0059 -0.3331 
Float 0.4670 0.4589 0.0081 0.5198 
Shares issued 1.9427 1.8064 0.1364 2.6210 
Underwriter 7.2467 7.4822 -0.2355 -1.6767 
Big 4 auditor 0.3728 0.3765 -0.0038 -0.1243 
VC back 0.3875 0.4049 -0.0174 -0.5385 
Commitment 0.6408 0.7457 -0.1048 -3.4846 
Firm age 2.2528 2.2792 -0.0263 -0.3833 
Equity carve-out 0.2439 0.2000 0.0439 1.6065 
NASDAQ 0.6503 0.6617 -0.0114 -0.3647 





Average First-Day Returns of IPOs and Terrorist Attacks 
This figure presents the average first-day returns of IPOs affected and not affected by terrorist attacks, 
respectively, for each year and in total. The numbers are not presented for 2000-2001, 2003-2005 and 2011 since 


















1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2002 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total





This table presents the annual distribution of the IPOs and the average first-day returns of IPOs affected and not affected by terrorist attacks, respectively. The variable definitions 
are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Year 
Full Sample Attack No Attack Diff. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
No. of IPOs 
Average First-
day return 
No. of IPOs 
Average First-
day return 
No. of IPOs 
Average First-
day return 
(4) Minus (6) t-Stat. 
1994 312 0.1130 45 0.0995 267 0.1152 -0.0157 -0.56 
1995 302 0.2402 27 0.1036 275 0.2536 -0.1501 -4.10 
1996 445 0.1807 36 0.0786 409 0.1897 -0.1112 -4.04 
1997 314 0.1464 22 0.1218 292 0.1483 -0.0265 -0.50 
1998 185 0.2198 48 0.1164 137 0.2393 -0.1229 -1.92 
1999 287 0.6409 58 0.4968 229 0.6774 -0.1805 -1.74 
2000 213 0.5730 0 - 213 0.5730 - - 
2001 46 0.1489 0 - 46 0.1489 - - 
2002 49 0.0701 6 0.0503 43 0.0729 -0.0226 -0.56 
2003 52 0.1301 0 - 52 0.1301 - - 
2004 134 0.1337 0 - 134 0.1337 - - 
2005 115 0.1029 0 - 115 0.1029 - - 
2006 125 0.1240 4 0.1134 121 0.1243 -0.0109 -0.24 
2007 153 0.1311 19 0.0339 134 0.1449 -0.1110 -3.89 
2008 23 0.0669 1 -0.0693 22 0.0776 -0.1469 -2.77 
2009 42 0.1156 12 0.1120 30 0.1137 -0.0017 -0.02 
2010 92 0.0958 12 0.1731 80 0.2474 -0.0743 -1.82 
2011 89 0.1102 0 - 89 0.1102 - - 
2012 115 0.1635 14 0.0843 101 0.1745 -0.0902 -2.43 
2013 173 0.1670 68 0.1613 105 0.1706 -0.0094 -0.22 
2014 211 0.1512 71 0.0692 140 0.1928 -0.1236 -3.61 
2015 130 0.1593 67 0.1172 63 0.2040 -0.0867 -2.33 
2016 76 0.1528 19 0.1143 57 0.1656 -0.0512 -0.94 





This table presents the summary statistics for the variables in this study. The variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix C. 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. 5% Median 95% 
First-day return 0.2172 0.4131 -0.0961 0.0933 0.9698 
Attack 0.1436 0.3508 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Offer size 4.1773 1.1559 2.1883 4.1109 6.2166 
Profitability 0.0313 0.2862 -0.1550 0.0352 0.2549 
Asset turnover 0.6118 0.6909 0.0000 0.3955 1.9828 
Market-to-book 2.4244 2.7955 0.1499 1.6950 7.3103 
Leverage 0.2280 0.2527 0.0010 0.1371 0.7385 
Float 0.4659 0.2404 0.1290 0.4330 0.9250 
Shares issued 1.8346 0.7621 0.7885 1.7234 3.3673 
Underwriter 7.4944 2.0692 3.0000 8.0000 9.0000 
Big 4 auditor 0.3702 0.4573 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
VC back 0.4054 0.4910 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Commitment 0.7879 0.4088 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Firm age 2.2439 1.0622 0.0000 2.1972 4.1431 
Equity carve-out 0.1890 0.3915 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
NASDAQ 0.6723 0.4694 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Election 0.0521 0.2223 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Market return 0.0375 0.0540 -0.0456 0.0422 0.1295 
ΔBusiness confidence 0.0071 0.1767 -0.2482 0.0095 0.2812 
ΔConsumer sentiment 0.0030 0.0384 -0.0560 0.0026 0.0599 
ΔPolicy uncertainty 4.4916 0.2976 4.0234 4.4572 5.1128 
EPS forecast revision 0.0289 0.2379 -0.2626 -0.0078 0.4146 
ΔReal risk premium -0.0003 0.0364 -0.0452 -0.0062 0.0600 









This table presents the correlation matrix for the variables in this study. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) First-day return 1.000            
(2) Attack -0.061 1.000           
(3) Offer size 0.025 0.053 1.000          
(4) Profitability 0.058 -0.058 0.109 1.000         
(5) Asset turnover -0.057 -0.012 -0.084 0.332 1.000        
(6) Market-to-book 0.332 0.002 -0.132 -0.156 -0.017 1.000       
(7) Leverage -0.125 0.035 0.151 0.056 0.162 -0.138 1.000      
(8) Float -0.163 0.002 -0.078 0.034 -0.108 -0.106 -0.019 1.000     
(9) Shares issued -0.071 0.058 0.940 0.078 -0.098 -0.181 0.171 -0.023 1.000    
(10) Underwriter 0.113 -0.005 0.589 0.082 -0.016 0.038 0.025 -0.145 0.455 1.000   
(11) Big 4 auditor 0.069 0.023 0.286 -0.041 -0.015 0.037 0.025 -0.073 0.259 0.312 1.000  
(12) VC back 0.206 -0.015 -0.113 -0.314 -0.167 0.266 -0.208 -0.082 -0.149 0.206 0.160 1.000 
(13) Commitment 0.077 -0.147 -0.276 0.101 0.097 0.101 -0.056 -0.008 -0.304 -0.069 -0.091 -0.014 
(14) Firm age -0.075 0.003 0.160 0.207 0.290 -0.137 0.179 -0.131 0.142 0.126 0.068 -0.123 
(15) Equity carve-out -0.063 0.057 0.208 0.118 0.072 -0.099 0.148 -0.025 0.215 0.055 0.040 -0.252 
(16) NASDAQ 0.130 -0.019 -0.325 -0.151 0.008 0.159 -0.143 -0.040 -0.357 -0.036 -0.017 0.324 
(17) Election -0.039 -0.075 -0.019 0.008 0.007 -0.003 -0.025 0.017 -0.015 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 
(18) Market return 0.034 -0.074 -0.057 0.025 0.002 0.009 -0.008 0.012 -0.068 -0.031 -0.017 -0.023 
(19) ΔBusiness confidence -0.001 -0.045 -0.013 0.031 -0.010 0.027 -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 -0.027 0.019 -0.021 
(20) ΔConsumer sentiment -0.020 0.015 -0.015 0.008 -0.010 0.011 -0.019 -0.018 -0.013 0.000 0.013 -0.006 
(21) ΔPolicy uncertainty -0.087 0.159 0.214 -0.031 -0.059 -0.110 0.052 -0.052 0.242 0.074 0.078 -0.024 
(22) EPS forecast revision -0.010 0.004 -0.015 -0.029 -0.006 0.018 -0.036 -0.050 -0.015 0.024 0.011 0.028 
(23) ΔReal risk premium -0.017 0.006 0.003 0.024 0.006 -0.019 0.016 -0.007 0.000 -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 





TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
(13) Commitment 1.000            
(14) Firm age -0.012 1.000           
(15) Equity carve-out -0.065 0.108 1.000          
(16) NASDAQ 0.055 -0.059 -0.188 1.000         
(17) Election -0.034 -0.033 -0.001 0.013 1.000        
(18) Market return 0.055 -0.004 -0.030 -0.025 0.067 1.000       
(19) ΔBusiness confidence -0.016 0.003 0.008 -0.026 0.005 0.201 1.000      
(20) ΔConsumer sentiment 0.008 -0.015 -0.020 -0.035 0.059 0.195 0.094 1.000     
(21) ΔPolicy uncertainty -0.192 -0.001 0.098 -0.109 -0.031 -0.225 -0.062 -0.076 1.000    
(22) EPS forecast revision 0.034 0.005 -0.029 0.006 0.034 -0.095 -0.100 0.058 -0.083 1.000   
(23) ΔReal risk premium -0.020 0.033 0.032 0.000 -0.030 -0.037 0.258 0.098 -0.017 0.033 1.000  





Terrorist Attacks and IPO First-Day Returns: Baseline Regression Results 
This table presents the regression results for the relation between terrorist attacks and IPO first-day returns. The 
regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All 
the regressions include a constant and industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0882 -5.07 -0.0825 -4.93 -0.0761 -4.47 
Offer size   0.2272 10.88 0.2223 10.64 
Profitability   0.0818 2.28 0.0823 2.31 
Asset turnover   -0.0431 -3.72 -0.0425 -3.67 
Market-to-book   0.0264 6.69 0.0267 6.79 
Leverage   -0.0295 -1.25 -0.0318 -1.35 
Float   -0.1056 -3.67 -0.1090 -3.81 
Shares issued   -0.2919 -10.86 -0.2859 -10.61 
Underwriter   0.0152 4.00 0.0145 3.81 
Big 4 auditor   0.0421 3.12 0.0449 3.33 
VC back   0.0574 3.55 0.0571 3.54 
Commitment   0.0031 0.21 0.0015 0.10 
Firm age   -0.0188 -3.33 -0.0190 -3.37 
Equity carve-out   -0.0048 -0.34 -0.0053 -0.38 
NASDAQ   0.0564 4.14 0.0542 3.96 
Election     -0.0335 -1.80 
Market return     0.2518 2.62 
ΔBusiness confidence     0.0326 0.67 
ΔConsumer sentiment     -0.1725 -1.28 
ΔPolicy uncertainty     -0.0753 -2.60 
EPS forecast revision     -0.0776 -2.34 
ΔReal risk premium     0.0767 0.47 
ΔReal 10 year rate     0.0006 0.23 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,683 3,683 3,683 








Terrorist Attacks and IPO First-Day Returns: Robustness Checks 
This table presents the regression results for various robustness checks for the relation between terrorist attacks 
and IPO first-day returns. For brevity, the table reports only the coefficient for terrorist attack. The regressions 
are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All the 
regressions include control variables, a constant, and industry, year, and state fixed effects, but these are not 
tabulated for brevity. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A: Additional controls 
(1) Control for pre-IPO media coverage (obs. = 1,838) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0730 -3.68 
Pre-IPO media coverage -0.0404 -3.69 
(2) Control for IPO day media coverage (obs. = 1,838) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0694 -3.50 
IPO-day media coverage -0.0522 -4.37 
(3) Control for pre-IPO advertising expenses (obs. = 2,140) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0724 -3.10 
Advertising intensity 0.0655 2.82 
Panel B: Alternative samples 
(1) Propensity score-matched sample based on all unaffected IPOs (obs. = 1,058) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0514 -2.21 
(2) Sample of 30-day pre- and post-attack IPOs (obs. = 934) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0621 -2.40 
(3)  Propensity score-matched sample based on 30-day pre-attack IPOs (obs. = 810) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0751 -2.80 
Panel C: Alternative terrorist attack windows  
(1) 15-day window (obs. = 3,683) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0816 -4.95 
(2) 45-day window (obs. = 3,683) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0591 -3.49 
(3) 60-day window (obs. = 3,683) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0388 -2.48 
Panel D: Decomposition of IPO initial return  
(1) Primary market return (obs. = 3,642) 
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Dependent variable: Primary return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0732 -4.04 
(2) Secondary market return (obs. = 3,642) 
Dependent variable: Secondary return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0054 -1.00 
Panel E: Excluding the transportation and tourism industries (obs. = 3,533) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0722 -4.14 
Panel F: Including mass shooting events from the MSA (obs. = 3,683) 
Dependent variable: First-day return 
 Coeff. t-Stat. 




Terrorist Attacks and Media-Based Sentiment Regarding IPOs 
This table presents the regression results for the relation between terrorist attacks and media-based sentiment 
regarding IPOs. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. All the regressions include a constant and industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: Negative articles Positive articles Average tone 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack 0.2545 4.09 -0.3791 -5.63 -0.2745 -5.78 
Offer size 0.0945 0.98 0.0586 0.49 -0.0113 -0.16 
Profitability -0.2157 -2.32 0.0744 2.16 0.1409 1.76 
Asset turnover -0.0974 -1.88 0.0079 0.13 0.0266 0.66 
Market-to-book 0.0178 0.97 -0.0114 -0.52 -0.0096 -0.64 
Leverage 0.1949 1.80 -0.3412 -2.59 -0.1598 -1.89 
Float -0.1069 -0.82 -0.2512 -1.37 -0.0460 -0.43 
Shares issued 0.0993 0.80 -0.0464 -0.31 -0.0810 -0.88 
Underwriter -0.0305 -1.71 0.0491 2.24 0.0235 1.76 
Big 4 auditor -0.0986 -1.06 0.1018 1.10 0.0776 1.08 
VC back -0.2729 -3.06 0.1940 1.96 0.1421 2.05 
Commitment 0.1138 1.71 -0.0491 -0.60 -0.0645 -1.21 
Firm age 0.0490 1.27 0.0610 1.47 -0.0067 -0.24 
Equity carve-out -0.0428 -0.57 0.0133 0.15 0.0050 0.08 
NASDAQ 0.0732 0.98 0.0550 0.64 -0.0237 -0.41 
Election 0.0998 0.65 -0.0830 -0.52 -0.0537 -0.42 
Market return -0.3157 -0.27 0.0178 0.02 -0.1523 -0.20 
ΔBusiness confidence 0.2260 0.89 -0.4197 -1.56 -0.4354 -2.43 
ΔConsumer sentiment 0.9293 1.14 -0.3050 -0.32 -0.5689 -0.96 
ΔPolicy uncertainty 0.2796 1.92 0.2468 1.60 0.0434 0.41 
EPS forecast revision 0.1077 0.55 -0.4006 -1.98 -0.1951 -1.32 
ΔReal risk premium 1.6485 1.38 2.6645 2.16 0.7263 0.89 
ΔReal 10 year rate 0.0169 1.31 -0.0241 -2.57 -0.0118 -1.55 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 536 536 536 






Terrorist Attacks and Post-IPO Operating Performance 
This table presents the regression results for the relation between terror attacks and post-IPO operating 
performance. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. All the regressions include a constant and industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA_1Y ROA_2Y ROA_3Y 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0005 -0.02 -0.0243 -1.06 -0.0277 -0.94 
Offer size 0.0373 1.89 0.0493 2.04 0.0877 2.99 
Profitability 0.8010 14.73 0.5191 10.37 0.3878 6.99 
Asset turnover 0.0376 3.70 0.0626 4.85 0.0729 4.72 
Market-to-book -0.0184 -3.64 -0.0376 -6.24 -0.0333 -5.03 
Leverage -0.0735 -2.31 -0.0875 -2.63 -0.1057 -2.35 
Float -0.0600 -1.30 -0.0389 -0.71 -0.0436 -0.61 
Shares issued -0.0332 -1.30 -0.0537 -1.76 -0.1076 -2.92 
Underwriter 0.0054 1.25 0.0089 1.74 0.0105 1.74 
Big 4 auditor -0.0147 -1.01 -0.0219 -1.27 -0.0225 -1.06 
VC back -0.0073 -0.43 -0.0041 -0.19 -0.0121 -0.45 
Commitment 0.0201 0.87 -0.0310 -1.36 -0.0308 -1.26 
Firm age -0.0016 -0.29 0.0135 2.06 0.0192 2.20 
Equity carve-out 0.0175 1.34 0.0162 1.04 0.0016 0.08 
NASDAQ 0.0044 0.38 -0.0073 -0.52 -0.0212 -1.03 
Election 0.0181 0.87 0.0129 0.44 -0.0330 -0.83 
Market return 0.0076 0.05 -0.1181 -0.55 -0.1817 -0.66 
ΔBusiness confidence -0.0520 -1.13 -0.0777 -1.42 -0.0509 -0.69 
ΔConsumer sentiment 0.2383 1.48 0.2921 1.68 0.3996 1.83 
ΔPolicy uncertainty 0.0277 0.90 0.0185 0.57 0.0227 0.56 
EPS forecast revision -0.0007 -0.03 -0.0815 -2.62 0.0036 0.10 
ΔReal risk premium 0.0444 0.28 0.0979 0.53 0.1145 0.41 
ΔReal 10 year rate 0.0012 0.55 0.0042 1.64 0.0028 1.00 
First-day return -0.0488 -1.65 -0.0675 -1.93 -0.0116 -0.32 
Managerial ownership -0.0158 -0.68 -0.0153 -0.58 -0.0121 -0.35 
Price revision 0.0188 0.34 0.0925 1.09 0.0705 0.60 
Market value 0.0141 3.30 0.0126 2.36 0.0202 3.31 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,828 2,828 2,828 






Terrorist Attacks and IPO First-Day Returns: Moderating Effect of IPO Firm Characteristics 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of IPO firm characteristics on the relation between terrorist 
attacks and IPO first-day returns. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. For the binary variable moderators, we also report the F-statisic for the 
conditional effect of Attack when the moderator takes the value 1. All the regressions include a constant and 
industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.1269 -3.58 -0.0683 -3.70 -0.0831 -2.99 
Attack*Firm age 0.0226 1.72     
Attack*Low profitability   -0.0990 -2.76   
Low profitability   -0.0428 -1.84   
Attack*Intangibility     -0.1444 -2.40 
Intangibility     0.0725 2.28 
Offer size 0.2225 10.64 0.2175 10.43 0.2383 11.26 
Profitability 0.0798 2.22 -0.0475 -1.14 0.1087 2.94 
Asset turnover -0.0426 -3.69 -0.0443 -3.85 -0.0434 -3.72 
Market-to-book 0.0267 6.79 0.0270 6.86 0.0274 6.79 
Leverage -0.0336 -1.43 -0.0318 -1.34 -0.0424 -1.90 
Float -0.1089 -3.80 -0.1090 -3.80 -0.1169 -3.87 
Shares issued -0.2861 -10.62 -0.2808 -10.41 -0.3048 -10.85 
Underwriter 0.0145 3.80 0.0145 3.80 0.0164 4.09 
Big 4 auditor 0.0450 3.33 0.0485 3.63 0.0548 3.99 
VC back 0.0566 3.50 0.0596 3.65 0.0518 3.15 
Commitment 0.0002 0.02 0.0004 0.03 0.0006 0.04 
Firm age -0.0220 -3.61 -0.0197 -3.48 -0.0218 -3.59 
Equity carve-out -0.0050 -0.36 -0.0054 -0.39 -0.0035 -0.24 
NASDAQ 0.0548 3.99 0.0546 3.99 0.0475 3.39 
Election -0.0338 -1.82 -0.0342 -1.83 -0.0380 -2.02 
Market return 0.2487 2.60 0.2515 2.62 0.3422 3.14 
ΔBusiness confidence 0.0327 0.67 0.0390 0.80 0.0170 0.34 
ΔConsumer sentiment -0.1737 -1.29 -0.1666 -1.24 -0.1420 -1.01 
ΔPolicy uncertainty -0.0854 -2.90 -0.0861 -3.00 0.0029 0.10 
EPS forecast revision -0.0781 -2.36 -0.0767 -2.32 -0.0702 -2.07 
ΔReal risk premium 0.0761 0.47 0.0672 0.41 0.1281 0.77 
ΔReal 10 year rate 0.0008 0.27 0.0006 0.20 0.0006 0.17 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,683 3,683 3,518 
Adjusted R2 0.3073 0.3092 0.3146 






Terrorist Attacks and IPO First-Day Returns: Moderating Effect of Third-Party Certification 
This table presents the regression results for the effect of third-party certification on the relation between terrorist 
attacks and IPO first-day returns. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. For the binary variable moderators, we also report the F-statisic for the 
conditional effect of Attack when the moderator takes the value 1. All the regressions include a constant and 
industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0935 -1.95 -0.0638 -2.53 -0.0580 -3.11 
Attack*Underwriter 0.0233 3.60     
Attack*Big 4 auditor   0.0863 2.80   
Attack*VC back     0.1155 3.79 
Offer size 0.2225 10.64 0.2221 10.64 0.2219 10.63 
Profitability 0.0815 2.28 0.0825 2.31 0.0797 2.22 
Asset turnover -0.0424 -3.67 -0.0425 -3.67 -0.0425 -3.68 
Market-to-book 0.0267 6.78 0.0267 6.79 0.0268 6.81 
Leverage -0.0319 -1.35 -0.0317 -1.35 -0.0319 -1.35 
Float -0.1090 -3.81 -0.1090 -3.81 -0.1093 -3.82 
Shares issued -0.2862 -10.61 -0.2855 -10.61 -0.2855 -10.60 
Underwriter 0.0149 3.57 0.0145 3.81 0.0144 3.79 
Big 4 auditor 0.0450 3.33 0.0518 3.54 0.0445 3.30 
VC back 0.0571 3.54 0.0573 3.55 0.0631 3.71 
Commitment 0.0015 0.10 0.0011 0.07 0.0016 0.11 
Firm age -0.0190 -3.36 -0.0190 -3.37 -0.0186 -3.29 
Equity carve-out -0.0053 -0.38 -0.0051 -0.37 -0.0064 -0.46 
NASDAQ 0.0544 3.96 0.0543 3.96 0.0520 3.81 
Election -0.0335 -1.80 -0.0339 -1.82 -0.0334 -1.79 
Market return 0.2508 2.62 0.2527 2.63 0.2513 2.62 
ΔBusiness confidence 0.0318 0.65 0.0323 0.66 0.0345 0.71 
ΔConsumer sentiment -0.1720 -1.28 -0.1723 -1.28 -0.1728 -1.28 
ΔPolicy uncertainty -0.0752 -2.60 -0.0718 -2.50 -0.0674 -2.30 
EPS forecast revision -0.0775 -2.34 -0.0771 -2.33 -0.0772 -2.33 
ΔReal risk premium 0.0786 0.48 0.0748 0.46 0.0672 0.41 
ΔReal 10 year rate 0.0006 0.23 0.0006 0.22 0.0006 0.22 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,683 3,683 3,683 
Adjusted R2 0.3107 0.3095 0.3079 






Salience of Terrorist Attacks and IPO First-Day Returns 
This table presents the regression results for the relation between the salience of terror attacks and IPO first-day returns. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics 
computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All the regressions include a constant and industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable definitions are presented 
in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return First-day return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Num attacks -0.0624 -2.32         
Financial center attack   -0.1084 -2.64       
Num fatalities     -0.0403 -2.05     
Time proximity       -0.0327 -2.10   
Distance proximity         -0.0356 -2.88 
Offer size 0.1230 2.87 0.1214 2.82 0.1184 2.79 0.1211 2.81 0.1202 2.80 
Profitability 0.1383 2.58 0.1296 2.40 0.1051 1.98 0.1290 2.40 0.1309 2.43 
Asset turnover 0.0119 0.50 0.0141 0.59 0.0154 0.64 0.0141 0.59 0.0143 0.62 
Market-to-book 0.0251 3.37 0.0251 3.34 0.0249 3.40 0.0252 3.36 0.0250 3.33 
Leverage -0.0303 -0.46 -0.0266 -0.40 -0.0324 -0.48 -0.0279 -0.42 -0.0235 -0.35 
Float -0.1853 -3.31 -0.1857 -3.28 -0.1833 -3.26 -0.1845 -3.27 -0.1787 -3.13 
Shares issued -0.1590 -2.74 -0.1562 -2.67 -0.1515 -2.62 -0.1554 -2.66 -0.1558 -2.67 
Underwriter 0.0186 2.80 0.0143 2.17 0.0188 2.80 0.0137 2.03 0.0156 2.38 
Big 4 auditor 0.0620 1.77 0.0615 1.74 0.0381 1.08 0.0630 1.80 0.0593 1.68 
VC back 0.0572 1.71 0.0618 1.88 0.0639 1.96 0.0632 1.92 0.0634 1.93 
Commitment 0.0007 0.02 0.0067 0.21 0.0133 0.43 0.0079 0.25 0.0072 0.23 
Firm age -0.0043 -0.31 -0.0033 -0.24 -0.0022 -0.16 -0.0032 -0.24 -0.0032 -0.23 
Equity carve-out -0.0237 -0.78 -0.0229 -0.75 -0.0195 -0.64 -0.0224 -0.73 -0.0212 -0.70 
NASDAQ 0.0543 2.47 0.0506 2.26 0.0489 2.18 0.0502 2.22 0.0481 2.14 
Election 0.0291 0.51 0.0390 0.66 0.0560 0.95 0.0497 0.84 0.0445 0.76 
Market return 1.0940 2.01 0.9767 1.66 0.9070 1.67 1.0349 1.89 1.0509 1.92 
ΔBusiness confidence 0.2333 1.28 0.2397 1.26 0.1504 0.88 0.2189 1.20 0.2205 1.20 
ΔConsumer sentiment -0.4993 -1.34 -0.4562 -1.16 -0.0778 -0.19 -0.3749 -1.01 -0.3646 -0.96 
ΔPolicy uncertainty 0.0140 0.14 0.0321 0.32 0.0565 0.60 0.0461 0.48 0.0499 0.52 
EPS forecast revision -0.0786 -0.90 -0.0711 -0.80 -0.0718 -0.83 -0.0667 -0.77 -0.0667 -0.77 
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ΔReal risk premium -0.5651 -0.63 -0.4248 -0.47 -0.1219 -0.14 -0.3670 -0.41 -0.4250 -0.47 
ΔReal 10 year rate 0.0013 0.28 0.0024 0.53 0.0042 0.93 0.0030 0.66 0.0022 0.47 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 529 529 529 529 529 






Terrorist Attacks and IPO Post-Listing Day Stock Returns 
This table presents the regression results for the relation between terror attacks and IPO post-listing day stock 
returns. The regressions are performed by OLS, with t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. All the regressions include a constant and industry, year, and state fixed effects. the variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: Return_1W Return_2W Return_4W 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack 0.0228 3.82 0.0257 2.89 0.0235 1.90 
Offer size -0.0013 -0.18 -0.0099 -1.05 -0.0207 -1.47 
Profitability 0.0144 2.56 0.0122 1.76 0.0656 3.50 
Asset turnover -0.0034 -1.11 -0.0039 -0.85 -0.0143 -2.25 
Market-to-book 0.0058 4.38 0.0100 5.04 0.0167 5.91 
Leverage 0.0018 0.22 0.0015 0.12 -0.0127 -0.78 
Float 0.0040 0.43 -0.0165 -1.21 -0.0394 -2.01 
Shares issued -0.0002 -0.02 0.0116 0.87 0.0295 1.51 
Underwriter 0.0003 0.27 0.0031 1.75 0.0060 2.25 
Big 4 auditor 0.0054 1.14 0.0124 1.90 0.0243 2.62 
VC back 0.0052 0.95 0.0164 2.09 0.0358 3.08 
Commitment 0.0065 1.01 0.0100 1.16 0.0144 1.20 
Firm age 0.0014 0.74 0.0030 1.12 -0.0025 -0.66 
Equity carve-out 0.0000 -0.01 0.0013 0.19 0.0041 0.40 
NASDAQ -0.0016 -0.34 0.0050 0.80 0.0144 1.54 
Election 0.0095 1.22 0.0057 0.53 -0.0046 -0.30 
Market return 0.0183 0.34 0.1732 2.27 0.3028 2.57 
ΔBusiness confidence -0.0073 -0.43 -0.0242 -1.01 -0.0495 -1.41 
ΔConsumer sentiment 0.0102 0.21 0.0252 0.37 -0.0023 -0.02 
ΔPolicy uncertainty 0.0079 0.76 0.0064 0.42 0.0118 0.53 
EPS forecast revision -0.0175 -1.56 -0.0090 -0.61 0.0588 2.59 
ΔReal risk premium 0.0837 1.58 0.2695 3.42 0.3386 3.00 
ΔReal 10 year rate -0.0009 -1.01 -0.0010 -0.90 -0.0010 -0.43 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,654 3,654 3,654 






Terrorist Attacks and Other Measures of IPO Performance 
This table presents the regression results for the relation between terrorist attacks and other measures of IPO 
performance, including price revision, oversubscription, total proceeds, and share revision. The regressions in 
columns (1), (3), and (4) are performed by OLS and the regression in column (2) is performed by probit, with t- 
or z-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. All the regressions include a constant and 
industry, year, and state fixed effects. The variable definitions are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable: Price revision Oversubscription Total proceeds 
Primary share 
revision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Attack -0.0133 -2.66 -0.0280 -6.13 -0.1044 -4.27 -0.1123 -2.28 
Offer size 0.0973 15.76 0.0078 0.89 - - -0.0974 -1.53 
Profitability 0.0078 0.95 0.0687 6.88 0.2711 3.74 -0.1656 -1.52 
Asset turnover -0.0068 -2.12 0.0196 3.40 0.0247 1.22 0.0313 0.87 
Market-to-book 0.0028 3.45 0.0131 6.80 0.0708 9.51 0.0124 0.83 
Leverage -0.0194 -2.66 -0.0179 -1.71 -0.0271 -0.61 0.1523 1.65 
Float -0.0055 -0.66 -0.0304 -2.27 0.4018 9.32 -0.3535 -3.23 
Shares issued -0.1162 -14.40 -0.0117 -0.99 0.0369 2.18 0.1744 1.92 
Underwriter -0.0060 -4.29 0.0086 5.13 0.0349 5.42 0.0223 1.87 
Big 4 auditor -0.0139 -2.87 -0.0080 -1.14 0.0420 1.90 0.0106 0.25 
VC back 0.0076 1.42 -0.0156 -1.67 0.0754 2.81 0.0948 1.76 
Commitment 0.0094 2.47 -0.0190 -2.70 -0.0118 -0.45 -0.0453 -0.59 
Firm age -0.0047 -2.50 0.0125 5.09 -0.0281 -2.89 0.0497 2.44 
Equity carve-out 0.0027 0.54 -0.0104 -1.41 0.0208 0.79 0.0899 1.72 
NASDAQ 0.0023 0.50 0.0088 1.34 0.0561 2.47 -0.0797 -1.68 
Election -0.0005 -0.06 0.0032 0.21 0.0309 0.67 0.0622 0.65 
Market return 0.1054 2.40 0.2769 4.14 0.0126 0.05 -0.3611 -0.73 
ΔBusiness confidence 0.0157 1.09 0.0128 0.51 -0.1262 -1.58 -0.0032 -0.02 
ΔConsumer sentiment 0.1103 2.70 -0.0953 -1.40 0.3750 1.62 0.7952 2.42 
ΔPolicy uncertainty -0.0221 -2.69 -0.0205 -2.44 0.0019 0.04 -0.0458 -0.44 
EPS forecast revision -0.0021 -0.28 0.0197 1.38 -0.0773 -2.30 0.3377 2.90 
ΔReal risk premium 0.0848 1.69 0.0453 0.59 -0.2044 -0.84 0.9047 1.37 
ΔReal 10 year rate 0.0002 0.22 -0.0007 -0.45 0.0079 2.31 0.0108 1.86 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,675 3,683 3,683 3,324 
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.1807 0.1270 0.2771 0.2495 
 
 
 
